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I. INTRODUCTIONT HE murder was brutal, and seemed even more senseless than most.
The defendant and three of his buddies, slighted when the victim
refused to talk with them, beat and kicked the victim, and smashed a
bottle over his head. They then picked through the victim's possessions,
looking for something to steal. After his friends left, Gathers, the de-
fendant, beat the victim with an umbrella, after which he inserted the
umbrella into the victim's anus. Gathers then left the unconscious vic-
tim. Gathers later returned with one of his companions and stabbed the
victim with a knife, killing him.
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. B.A.
1979, St. Norbert College; J.D. 1982, Marquette University; LL.M. 1987, Harvard University. My
thanks to my colleagues Beto Juarez and Wayne Scott for their comments and suggestions on a
previous draft, and to Bob Destro, Alan Freeman and Steven D. Smith for their insights on more
recent drafts. A'talk based on a previous draft of this paper was given at the Third Annual Sympo-
sium on Law, Religion and Ethics at Hamline University School of Law, Oct. 26, 1990.
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Gathers was found guilty of murder. In South Carolina, a jury may
sentence a murderer to death. During closing argument to the jury in the
death penalty phase, the prosecutor told the jury the following:
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a reli-
gious person. He had his religious items out there. This defendant strewn
[sic] them across the bike path, thinking nothing of that.
Among the many cards that Reverend Haynes had among his belong-
ings was this card. It's in evidence. Think about it when you go back there.
He had this [sic] religious items, his beads. He had a plastic angel. Of
course, he is now with the angels now, but this defendant Demetrius Gath-
ers could care little about the fact that he is a religious person. Cared little
of the pain and agony he inflicted upon a person who is trying to enjoy one
of our public parks.
But look at Reverend Minister Haynes' prayer. It's called the Game
Guy's Prayer. "Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I
don't ask for any easy place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me.
I only ask you for the stuff to give you one hundred percent of what I have
got. If all the hard drives seem to come my way, I thank you for the com-
pliment. Help me to remember that you won't ever let anything come my
way that you and I together can't handle. And help me to take the bad
break as part of the game. Help me to understand that the game is full of
knots and knocks and trouble, and make me thankful for them. Help me to
be brave so that the harder they come the better I like it. And, oh God,
help me to always play on the square. No matter what the other players do,
help me to come clean. Help me to study the book so that I'll know the
rules, to study and think a lot about the greatest player that ever lived and
other players that are portrayed in the book. If they ever found out the best
part of the game was helping other guys who are out of luck, help me to
find it out, too. Help me to be regular, and also an inspiration with the
other players. Finally, oh God, if fate seems to uppercut me with both
hands, and I am laid on the shelf in sickness or old age or something, help
me to take that as part of the game, too. Help me not to whimper or squeal
that the game was a frameup or that I had a raw deal. When in the falling
dusk I get the final bell, I ask for no lying, complimentary tombstones. I'd
only like to know that you feel that I have been a good guy, a good game
guy, a saint in the game of life." 1
The murder victim, Richard Haynes, was a self-proclaimed preacher
who called himself "Reverend Minister,"2 by which the prosecutor con-
tinually referred to him during the trial. During the guilt phase of the
trial, Haynes' mother testified that her son habitually carried a Bible and
other religious items with him, and that he talked to people about the
1. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 808.09 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111
S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991).
2. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 807.
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Lord all the time. One of the companions of the defendant testified that
Haynes' Bible was clearly visible when they initially approached him;
Haynes' possessions that night, including "olive oil, plastic angels, rosary
beads, two Bibles, a voter registration card, and the 'Game Guy's
Prayer' "I were also introduced into evidence, although none of those
items was clearly referred to during the guilt phase of the trial. These
items of evidence were entered without objection, although defense coun-
sel complained about the prosecutor's continual references to Haynes as
"Reverend Minister." 4
The jury sentenced Demetrius Gathers to death. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed, in part because the comments by the prose-
cutor suggested that "because the victim was a religious man," Gathers
deserved the death penalty.5 The Supreme Court, without discussing the
propriety of using religion to appeal to the jury, affirmed the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court based on its decision in Booth v. Maryland, 6 which
forbade the use of victim impact statements in death penalty cases.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, dissented from the application of the Booth test. Unlike the ma-
jority, Justice O'Connor questioned whether the prosecutor's actions
were an unconstitutional appeal to religious bias. She wrote that the
claim of the defendant was that "the prosecutor's closing argument im-
permissibly invited the jury to impose the death sentence on the basis of
the victim's religion and political affiliation in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause."7 While she speculated that, because the Game Guy's
Prayer was already admitted into evidence, any error might constitute
harmless error, she concluded that she would remand the case to the
South Carolina Supreme Court for an inquiry on this issue. Before dis-
cussing the due process issue, however, Justice O'Connor stated, "[t]hat
the victim in this case was a deeply religious and harmless individual
who exhibited his care for his community by religious proselytization
and political participation in its affairs was relevant to the community's
loss at his demise." 8 Since being religious and talking with people about
religion is deemed a communal good, Justice O'Connor accepted that
any revelation to the jury of the religiosity of the victim is an aid to the
3. Id. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 823.
5. Gathers'v. State, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988).
6. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Booth was overruled last term in the case of Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
CL 2597, 2611 (1991).




jury in assessing the punishment to be given to the defendant. At the
same time, Justice O'Connor accepted the notion that putting a person to
death because of the religious affiliation of the victim is a form of reli-
gious discrimination which is unconstitutional. In other words, at a
broad level of generality, evidence of religion may be given the jury, but
at a narrower level of generality, evidence of religion is impermissible.
The prosecutor focused the jury's attention on Haynes' religiosity in
several ways: first, by repeatedly calling Richard Haynes "Reverend
Minister" during both phases of the trial; second, by eliciting testimony
during the guilt phase of the trial from Haynes' mother that Haynes car-
ried a Bible with him and spoke to people about the Lord; third, by di-
recting the jury's attention to the "olive oil, plastic angels, rosary beads,
[and] two Bibles," at the penalty phase; and fourth, by quoting from the
"Game Guy's Prayer" during the penalty phase of the trial. The prose-
cutor was likely assuming both that it was important for the jury to know
that Richard Haynes was a religious person and, more importantly, that
informing the jury of Haynes' faith as a Christian would assist in per-
suading the jury of the defendant's guilt and that he should be punished
by death.
When testimony about the religiosity of the victim is elicited, the
jury will likely become aware of the religious affiliation of the victim.
While the jury may not know whether the victim was Presbyterian, Bap-
tist or Methodist, it will almost always know whether the victim was
Christian, Jew or Muslim. Given the inherent difficulty with Justice
O'Connor's approach, should the legal system resort to a formal neutral-
ity which attempts to separate religion by categorically barring its
admissibility?
Justice O'Connor pitches the virtue of religion at a broad level of
generality, in part to avoid concluding that the prosecutor was arguing
that Gathers deserved to die because of Haynes' religious affiliation, and
in part because knowing that the victim was religious may assist the jury
in "knowing" the victim. In her view, evidence of the victim's religious-
ness may be introduced to the jury for whatever consideration it may
give that information. As will be later discussed, Justice O'Connor is
attempting to find a middle course between requiring a trial, in particu-
lar, a murder trial, to be a "purely intellectual performance," 9 and per-
mitting jurors to base their decision simply on factors perceived as
emotional or irrational. It appears that whether the victim was an "es-
9. Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 4 (1942) [hereinafter Fore-
word] ("A trial cannot be a purely intellectual performance.").
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tablished" minister, a devoutly religious person, or a member of a reli-
gious "cult," the community may learn of the religiosity of the victim in
assessing the punishment given the defendant. The prosecutor, at a
much more specific level of generality, by referring to Haynes as "Rever-
end Minister" and by discussing Haynes' Christian beliefs, was trying to
persuade the jury that these particular facts were important for them to
know.
The difficulty with the move to formal neutrality is that it is so easily
evaded at trial. Two recent trials are instructive.
Last year, in San Antonio, Texas, there was a trial concerning the.
death of a twenty year old aspiring singer named Cassandra Rodriguez.
Ms. Rodriguez drove into a flooded city intersection and drowned when
her compact car was swept by the floodwater from the intersection into a
drainage culvert. Early in the civil trial against the City of San Antonio,
the plaintiffs, Ms. Rodriguez's parents, called the Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop of San Antonio, Patricio (Patrick) Flores, to the stand. Accord-
ing to the newspaper account of his testimony, Archbishop Flores
testified that Ms. Rodriguez's death was "a great loss to the city, the
church and to all."' 1 He continued, "[i]t's not often I can't control my-
self at a funeral, but I could not at this one," and also testified that the
funeral was one of the largest he had witnessed since becoming Arch-
bishop in 1979.11
The Archbishop's testimony, at least that testimony excerpted in the
newspaper report, bears little relevance to the factual issues of the case.
Further, in terms of its publication value, the account printed in the pa-
per seems newsworthy not for reasons of explaining the dangerousness of
an intersection used by many in the city nor for showing the grief of
Cassandra Rodriguez's parents, but because the witness was the Arch-
bishop of San Antonio. One of the attorneys for the Rodriguezes stated
that the Archbishop's testimony was relevant to the issue of damages,
since he knew Cassandra Rodriguez and testified about her character, as
well as the grief suffered by her parents. The plaintiffs' attorney also
10. Dan Kelly, Flores Testifies in Lawsuit Over Five Points Drowning, SAN ANToNo LwGHT,
July 27, 1990, at B5. The majority of the residents of Bexar County (which encompasses the City of
San Antonio) are Hispanic, and the majority of Hispanics in Bexar County are Roman Catholic.
Archbishop Flores was the first Hispanic Archbishop of the San Antonio Archdiocese, and his stew-
ardship has been greatly admired throughout his eleven years in San Antonio. He is a heroic figure
who is much beloved.
11. Id. The jury decided that the City of San Antonio was 75% at fault, and awarded damages
in the amount of $1.4 million, including $500,000 in punitive damages. Dan Kelly, City Loses Five
Points Drowning Lawsuit, SAN ANToNo LxGHT, Aug. 18, 1990, at Al.
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stated that the jury was heavily Hispanic and heavily Catholic,12 and that
he and his co-counsel were hopeful that hearing testimony from "an em-
issary of God"13 would influence the jury to award the plaintiffs a larger
sum in damages.
During the trial of then Washington, D.C., Mayor Marion Barry on
charges of cocaine possession and perjury, the trial judge barred the Rev-
erend Louis Farrakhan and the Reverend George Stallings from attend-
ing the trial, holding that their presence would be disruptive and might
intimidate the jury. 4 After the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case to Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson with instructions to hold a hearing on their presence,15
the Revs. Farrakhan and Stallings were allowed to attend the trial. 6 The
post-trial news reports concerning the jury's deliberations do not men-
tion whether the presence of the Revs. Farrakhan and Stallings had any
impact on the jury.
Justice O'Connor and the prosecutor in the Gathers case, the attor-
neys for the Rodriguezes, and Judge Jackson in the Barry case have all
tapped into something about juries and decisionmaking. One of the shin-
ing examples showing the greatness of the United States is the people's
unswerving dedication to the constitutionally-based legal ideal of the sep-
aration of church and state. At the same time, opinion polls routinely
indicate the United States is an extremely religious country. A person is
not logically inconsistent if she supports the ideal of separation and is
religious. The conflict concerns the social (and inevitably, legal) permis-
12. In the Texas jury information form filled out by prospective jurors and reviewed by attor-
neys, the prospective juror is asked to write down his or her religion. The attorneys for the
Rodriguezes were thus well aware of the religious affiliations of the impanelled jury.
In the recent trial of the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center's Dennis Barrie for obscenity for
displaying photographs taken by Robert Mapplethorpe, the Wall Street Journal noted that "[a]t least
four [jurors] have been active church members." Alecia Swasy & Milo Geyelin, Jurors Chosen In
Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1990, at B5. I inferred that the "religiosity" of
several of the jurors made it less likely that Barrie would either get a fair trial, or made it more likely
that he would be convicted. Barrie was acquitted. Milo Geyelin, Cincinnati Sends a Warning to
Censors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1990, at BI. Ironically, the jurors acquitting Barrie did so in deference
to the expert testimony presented by the defense. See Isabel Wilkerson, Obscenity Jurors Were Pul-
led Two Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at A12.
13. Telephone Interview with Randall Jackson, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys (Sept. 4, 1990).
14. George Hackett & Bob Cohn, Mayor Barry: Lurid Tales of the Tape, NEWSWEEK, July 9,
1990, at 25. During closing argument, Barry's attorney called the prosecution's witnesses "little
Lucifers." "Little Lucifers' at Barry Trial, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Aug. 3, 1990, at A4.
15. United States v. Barry, No. 3152, 1990 WL 104925 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1990),
16. See Ronald L. Goldfarb, Criminal Trials: How Public, Whose Public?, WASH. LAW., Sept./
Oct. 1990, at 48. In discussing the criminal defendant's right to bring "guests" into the courtroom,
the author posits a case of bringing as a guest "a clergyman in an adulterous divorce case." Id. at 49.
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sibility of speaking publicly about one's religious faith or justifying one's
actions by resort to one's religious faith. The ideal of separation, to pro-
mote religious liberty, is altered to promote secular liberty, for example,
by requiring nonreligious justifications for public acts.17 Religion is
cabined within the private lives of Americans. The "conflict" is best ex-
plicated by a statement made during the 1988 campaign for President by
George Bush:
Was I scared floating around in a little yellow raft off the coast of an enemy-
held island, setting a world record for paddling? Of course I was. What
sustains you in times like that? Well, you go back to fundamental values. I
thought about Mother and Dad and the strength I got from them - and
God and faith and the separation of Church and State.18
It is difficult to imagine someone in mortal danger thinking about
the separation of church and state. The appending of the "separation"
language indicates that presidential candidate Bush was concerned some
might believe his religious belief was not tempered by his knowing that
religion was a "private" matter. The bow to separation is an acceptance
of the view that religious beliefs affect only one's private life.
If citizens of the United States believe themselves to be religious,
then calling the murder victim "Reverend Minister," eliciting testimony
about the carrying of and visibility of a Bible and quoting from the
"Game Guy's Prayer" during closing argument are all ways of introduc-
ing evidence of religion to persuade the jury of the prosecutor's case.
Similarly, the decision of an attorney in a wrongful death case to call a
popular religious figure as a witness to testify to the tragedy of that death
may also influence the jury. Finally, barring two black religious figures
whose orations regularly excoriate whites as racists from the trial of a
prominent and popular black politician is intended to prevent a swaying
of the jury by information which is not accepted evidence.
Several problems arise out of these cases. First, if evidence of reli-
gion can be useful, then conversely, it can be harmful. Second, in order
to prevail at trial, parties may be forced to choose between alienating the
jury by following their religious tenets and abjuring their religious beliefs
in order to be perceived more favorably by the jury. Third, because of
17. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) (argu-
ing the permissibility in liberal theory of using religious beliefs in public life). Cf GARRY WILLS,
UNDER GOD 341-85 (1990). Wills states that "America has remained deeply religious while taking
evermore seriously the ideal of separation." Id. at 379.




the structure of the trial and the rules of evidence, the response to evi-
dence of religion is so idiosyncratic as to be worse than useless.
The sole effort to evaluate evidence of religion found in the rules of
evidence is a resort to the formal neutrality of Federal Rule of Evidence
610,19 which is inapplicable to any of the cases discussed above. While
this formal response solves several problems for judges, it creates a
chasm in understanding the interplay between law and religion in the
courtroom, for judges are not required to understand that interplay, but
can simply recite Rule 610, even where the rule is inapplicable. Simi-
larly, when courts are faced with difficult issues of religious liberty in the
setting of the courtroom, the unconsidered response is simply to cite to
"separation of church and state," rather than to evaluate the individual's
interest in religious liberty and the public's (or state's) interest in avoid-
ing religiously-based discrimination or a conjoining of law and religion.
The purpose of this article is to examine several ways in which reli-
gion is admitted or excluded from the courthouse in light of the analo-
gous ideals (or slogans) of separation of church and state and the rule of
law. Ordinarily, this would mean a broad examination of the clergy-
penitent privilege,2° or a discussion of its existence in federal common
law.2" The use of religion extends further than that, however, as shown
by the skillful use of religion by the prosecutor in the Gathers case, the
19. Religious Beliefs and Opinions: Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their
nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced.
FED. R. EVID. 610.
20. See eg., Michael C. Smith, The Pastor on the Witness Stand: Toward a Religious Privilege in
the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1 (1984). Alternatively, a discussion could focus on the tradition of
calling ministers as character witnesses in behalf of a defendant in a criminal trial, or the use of
religion by attorneys in closing arguments. See The Art of Legal Method: Closing Arguments in State
v. Leopold and Loeb, in FAMOUS AMERICAN JURY SPEECHES 992 (Frederick C. Hicks ed., 1925),
excerpted in WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS 670-
720 (1972). There are a number of references to religion by attorneys in jury trials referenced in
FAMOUS AMERICAN JURY SPEECHES. See also.Carol Weisbrod, Charles Guiteau and the Christian
Nation, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 187 (1989) (discussing the use of Christianity in the 19th century trial of
Charles Guiteau, the assassin of James Garfield); John S. Hilbert, Comment, God in a Cage: Reli-
gion, Intent, and Criminal Law, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 701 (1987) (assessing whether religious belief can
negate intent in criminal law); Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 254 A.2d 24 (Pa. 1969) (holding a court's
instruction to "do what is right and proper in the sight of Almighty God" was reversible error).
21. The Supreme Court's draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence contained 13 rules on privi-
leges, including a clergy-penitent privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 506 (Proposed, Supreme Court Advi-
sory Committee, 1972). The Federal Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress deleted those privilege
rules, substituting a single rule which suggests a common law approach to the adoption 6f specific
privileges. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Cf United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822 (N.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 665 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 includes a clergy-
penitent privilege and holding that the privilege was inapplicable).
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calling of Archbishop Flores as a witness, and the presence of the Revs.
Louis Farrakhan and George Stallings at the trial of Marion Barry.
This article begins with an overview of the contemporary jurispru-
dence of law and religion. After briefly tracing the path of twentieth
century legal thought and evidentiary reform, the article explores the
general issue of separating religion from the courtroom by reviewing the
history, purpose and theory of Federal Rule of Evidence 610.22 The arti-
cle then analyzes three paradigm cases of evidence of religion: first,
whether an attorney who is also a cleric may wear religious garb at a jury
trial;2 3 second, the response of the legal system when jurors and juries
make decisions relying upon their own religious beliefs; 4 and third, a
speculative examination of two cases which may indicate the effect a
judge's religious beliefs can have on legal decisionmaking.25 Throughout
this article, two distinct points become apparent. First, the structure of
the adversary system and the rules of evidence invite attorneys to use
anything, including religion, to persuade a jury. Second, the rules of evi-
dence and our jurisprudential system lack both the vocabulary and the
theoretical foundation to evaluate evidence of religion.
This article is not intended to address two related issues. The pres-
ence of aspects of the American civil religion2 6 in the courtroom, from
the oration, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court" in
the Supreme Court, to the requirement that witnesses swear an oath or
22. The only recent article discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 610 is Karl R. Moor & Jennifer
M. Busby, Cacotheism and the False Witness A Modest Proposal for Amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 75 (1988) (suggesting a modification of Rule 610 to permit examination
of a witness' religious beliefs to show interest or bias or to show membership in a group which
encourages or requires making false statements). See infra text accompanying notes 65-87.
23. There will be some comparisons made concerning the legal permissibility of a party, witness
or spectator to wear religious garb at a jury trial. See infra text accompanying notes 111-49.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 143-78.
25. See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989)
(discussing in liberal theory whether religious beliefs may be relied upon by the morally sensitive
judge when deciding cases). See infra text accompanying notes 179-202. Cf United States v. Bak-
ker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991) (vacating the sentence of televangelist Jim Bakker, and remanding
the case for resentencing, because the sentencing judge stated during sentencing that "those of us
who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or priests"). See
also Judge is Reprimandedfor Referring to God, N.Y. TIMES (Midwest Edition), June 29, 1991, at 9
(reporting that a Minnesota judge was reprimanded by the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards
for expressing religious beliefs in court); Gov. Wilder is Questioning Role of Thomas'Religion, WALL
ST. J., July 3, 1991, at As (quoting Wilder as asking "[Tihe question is: How much allegiance does
[Mr. Thomas] have to the pope?").
26. Robert Bellah, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADrIONAL WORLD
168-89 (1970). See also CIVIL RELIGION AND POLmcAL THEOLOGY (Leroy S. Rouner ed., 1986).
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affirm27 that they will tell the truth, "so help me God," will only be dis-
cussed tangentially. Further, this article does not explore the effect on
adjudication when the plaintiff or defendant is a religious entity.28
II. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LAW OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The words that bind American law to our system of justice are
"neutrality" and "impartiality." Chief Justice Marshall opined long ago
that the "government of the United States has been emphatically termed
a government of laws, and not of men."29 We continue to comfort our-
selves and justify our legal system with references to the "rule of law."3
Just as clearly, the adversary system, the governing form of adjudi-
cation in the United States, has attained the authority it possesses in part
due to the appearance of impartiality of the factfinder and the lawmaker.
Parties to a case are entitled to an impartial jury of their peers. 31 They
are also entitled to an impartial judge.32
The words "neutrality" and "impartiality" also bind the legal rela-
27. Federal Rule of Evidence 603, entitled "Oath or Affirmation," provides: "Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirma-
tion administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness'
mind with the duty to do so."
28. See eg., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1084
(1989) (suit alleging fraud by the Unification Church); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984) (criminal prosecution for tax evasion, among other
charges, of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, founder of the Unification Church). See also CARLTON
SHERWOOD, INQUISITION: THE PERSECUTION AND PROSECUTION OF THE REVEREND SUN MY-
UNG MOON (1991) (arguing Moon's prosecution was tactically based on attacking Moon by attack-
ing the Unification Church).
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
30. See, eg., Kenneth R. Starr, The Supreme Court, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, 73
JUDICATURE 159 (19.89) (discussing the centrality of the rule of law to American society). Contra
GRANT GILMORE, THE AaES OF AMERICAN LAW 105 (1977) ("The idea of law was ridiculously
oversold, which led to great confusion in the public mind when it became clear that ours is a govern-
ment not of laws but of men and that justice under law is notably unequal.").
31. The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed." This right was applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1969). See Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 167-68 (1879). In Reynolds, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by
charging the jury to consider the consequences of polygamy. The Court held that the trial court did
not appeal to the passions or prejudices of the jury, that it did not try "to make them partial, but to
keep them impartial." Id at 168. See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Vanishing Civil Jury, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7 (1990) (complaining that "[t]he impartial resolution of disputes, a basic social
service, is not a service that our society provides very well").
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1991) (disqualifying judges who have evidenced a bias in favor of or a
prejudice against a party). Cf. Carter, supra note 25 (discussing whether, pursuant to liberal theory,
a judge may use her religious convictions in making decisions).
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tionship between government and religion. The First Amendment's reli-
gion clauses are designed, the Supreme Court has stated, to create a
neutrality between the state and religion.33 This neutrality is ascertained
through decisions crafted by impartial decisionmakers. The Supreme
Court, caught in an entangling web in its religion clause jurisprudence,
declaims a freedom from that entangling web through its oft-stated com-
mitment to neutrality between religion and government by separating
religion from government.
During the decade of the 1980s, explication of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment consumed a great deal of the Court's time. From
Widmar v. Vincent,34 to Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock35 and in be-
tween,36 the Court has attempted to articulate notions of neutrality and
impartiality when deciding the constitutionality of actions involving both
government and religion. This effort to shape doctrine disintegrated at
the end of the decade,37 in large part because notions of impartiality and
33. See, eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms....
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line.").
34. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding unconstitutional as violating the Free Speech Clause the deci-
sion of the University of Missouri at Kansas City to deny campus religious organizations, but not
any others, the use of available classrooms for meetings).
35. 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See infra note 37.
36. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Her-
nandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S.
829 (1989); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619
(1986); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1986); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1986); Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of
Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); and
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
37. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), Justice Brennan wrote a plurality
opinion holding that a Texas statute which exempted from its sales tax only religious publications
violated the Establishment Clause. Justices Blackmun and White concurred in the judgment only,
joined by Justice O'Connor in the latter opinion, and Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy.
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), the other
contentious religion clause case of the term, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the badly di-
vided Court. "Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to Parts III-A, IV, and V, an opinion with respect to Parts I and II, in which
Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens join, an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Justice
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neutrality were grounded on ideas of separation which failed both juris-
prudentially3" and socially.39 The likelihood that the Court will decide a
number of religion cases in the near future is great, so long as the Court
is focused on implementing their views of impartiality and neutrality
based on the failed effort of separation.'
With the exception of the elliptical discussion already noted above
in South Carolina v. Gathers,41 and an endorsement of Federal Rule of
Evidence 610,42 the Supreme Court has not discussed the propriety or
constitutionality of the use of evidence of religion in the courtroom.43
Indeed, even in the state courts, confrontations with religion are met
with puzzlement, and dismissed perfunctorily by references to "separa-
tion," without a discussion of the ways in which this issue can (or
should) affect the decisions of jurors and juries. What little evidence
there is suggests that the Supreme Court, in religion clause cases, and
state courts, in cases involving evidence of religion, believe that a separa-
tion of religion from public life, like a stated adherence to the Rule of
Law, will create an "impartiality" or "neutrality" in legal decisionmak-
Stevens joins, and an opinion with respect to Part VI." Id at 577. Justice O'Connor wrote an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in Part II of which Justices Brennan and
Stevens joined; Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Justices Stevens and Marshall; and Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, joined by Justices White and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun's
opinion held that placing the cr6che in the courthouse was unconstitutional but that saluting reli-
gious liberty by placing on public property a Christmas tree next to a menorah was not an impermis-
sible establishment of religion. I at 601-02, 620. Justice Brennan's opinion was that both displays
were unconstitutional, and Justice Kennedy's opinion was that both were constitutional. Id. at 637,
655. See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (both attempting to reconstruct (or is it deconstruct?)
free exercise doctrine).
38. See, eg., Michael W. McConnell, Why 'Separation' Is Not the Key to Church-State Rela-
dons, 106 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 43 (1989).
39. See generally A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985); see also
RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (2d ed. 1984).
40. The Court continues to hear and attempt to resolve cases of law and religion. See Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Employment Div. v. Smith, 110
S. CL 1595 (1990); Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990); and Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). See also Lee v. Weisman, cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
41. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). See text accompanying notes 6-8.
42. This "endorsement" may have been perfunctory. When Justice Douglas dissented from the
Supreme Court's decision to send the Federal Rules of Evidence to the Congress, one reason given
by him was that the Court had merely rubber stamped the rules. 56 F.R.D. 185-86 (1972). See also
FED. R. EVID. 506 (Proposed, Supreme Court Advisory Committee, 1972) (creating a clergy-peni-
tent privilege, which was approved by the Supreme Court but deleted by Congress).
43. One explanation, of course, is that the Supreme Court rarely decides evidentiary issues of a
substantive nature. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 21 FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5006 (1977).
EVIDENCE OF RELIGION
ing. Religion is cabined in First Amendment jurisprudence because its
role in public life must be limited, and evidence of religion can not be
permitted in the courtroom because religion can play no role in judging.
The irony is that, no matter how much courts restrict religion, it won't
go away as long as persons are religious, and religion will be a part of
public life in myriad ways.
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
EVIDENCE OF RELIGION
A. Introduction'
One of the goals of twentieth century American legal progressives
was the creation of a more "rational" system of proof. From Roscoe
Pound's efforts to reform the adversary system by giving greater discre-
tion to judges presiding over trials,45 to John Henry Wigmore's rationali-
zation and reformation of the law of evidence,' these attempts at reform
were undertaken to permit the trial to become a search for truth rather
than a game or sport. This faith in the rationality of law and in ration-
alizing the administration of justice ill fit with "irrational" faiths like
religion.
The rise of American legal realism led to doubts about broad no-
tions of the rationality of law and the legal system, faith in judges and the
idea of truth and absolute values. 7 Legal progressivism was revived as
legal process after World War II (and the demise of legal realism) by
scholars who largely were educated or who taught at Harvard Law
School. These scholars tried to repair a faith in the autonomy of law and
its rationality. Even after legal realism coaxed some progressives into
abandoning truth as the sole goal of adjudication, and abandoning the
44. The material in this subsection is treated more comprehensively in a forthcoming article
discussing twentieth century efforts to reform the American law of evidence. See Michael Ariens,
Progress Is Our Only Product" Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence (forthcoming, currently
on file with author).
45. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction in the Administration of Justice, 29
A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906) (reprinting Pound's 1906 speech to the annual convention of the American
Bar Association).
46. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATisE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1st ed. 1904-05) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]. A second edi-
tion was published in 1923, and a third edition in 1940.
47. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Insti-
tute, 27 A.B.A. J. 539 (1941) [hereinafter Proposed Code] ("A lawsuit is not a means of making a
scientific investigation for the ascertainment of truth; it is a proceeding for the orderly settlement of a




search for absolute values, there remained a faith in the rational exercise
of judicial discretion and the value of process. The Model Code of Evi-
dence, adopted by the American Law Institute in 1942, was one attempt
to repair a faith in law by relying on the expertise and discretion of
judges. The Model Code was the basis for two subsequent evidence
codes, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, both of which gave the trial court expansive discretion to admit
evidence.
The efforts of reformers to structure guidelines for rational decision-
making necessitated the drawing of lines, marking off the rational from
the irrational. Religion was lumped together with the irrational, thus
cabining religion within bounds which many persons do not recognize.
This approach by the progressives is not surprising, since intellectual
thought since the Enlightenment has been incommensurable with reli-
gion.4 8 Faith in rationality, including a faith in the rationality of law,
was an intellectual substitute for religion. When the realists attacked the
rationality of law, they were attacking the faith held by reformers. Ef-
forts to repair that shattered faith are found in the Model Code of Evi-
dence and its successor, the Federal Rules of Evidence.
B. Historical Background
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is
not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the
witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced.49
Rule 610 contains the only reference to religion in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The Rule is itself a byproduct of the historical effort to
make rules of proof more rational by ridding the law of evidence of reli-
gious conceptions.5" In the twentieth century we have witnessed the
48. See generally SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES (1989); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1990)
("The natural law project has never recovered from what Nietzsche called the death of God (at the
hands of Darwin)."). Cf Elizabeth V. Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals,
Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1034-37 (1991) ("Christian, including evangelical, reac-
tion to Darwin was by no means uniformly negative."). See also WILLS, supra note 17, at 97-114
(discussing the intellectual fallout from the Scopes trial and William Jennings Bryan's fear, not of
evolution, but of social Darwinism).
49. FED. R. EVID. 610.
50. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Ch. 6 at 218 (1942).
The Anglo-Saxon trial by ordeal, the Anglo-Norman trial by battle, and trial by compur-
gation both before and after the Norman Conquest were essentially adversary proceed-
ings. Though they were conducted under the supervision of the court, the adversaries
furnished the actors through whom they appealed to the Deity for a decision. The insti.
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completion of the disconnection between religion and the law of evidence
in two notable respects: oathtaking and the dying declaration exception
to hearsay.
In 1940, Wigmore stated that the oath was historically understood
as "a summoning of divine vengeance upon false swearing.... [The oath]
is now conceived as a method of reminding the witness strongly of the
divine punishment somewhere in store for false swearing, and thus of
putting him in a frame of mind calculated to speak only the truth as he
saw it."51 Two years later, the comment to Model Code of Evidence
Rule 103 explicitly disavowed this chain of reasoning, holding that a dis-
belief in God was no bar to taking the oath; in this case, however, the
Model Code of Evidence was not anticipating this change, but simply
was acknowledging the decisions of the states deciding this issue.52
In explaining the dying declaration exception to hearsay, Wigmore
discussed whether there was a requirement precedent to admissibility
that the declarant believe that a Higher Power would punish a liar. His
conclusion was that the several courts deciding the issue treated as essen-
tial to a statement's admission a theological belief in a future punishment
for lying. Wigmore declared that the better rule was finding that the
declarant had "a natural and instinctive awe at the approach of an un-
known future - a physical revulsion common to all men, irresistible,
and independent of theological belief."53 The Model Code of Evidence
subsumed the dying declaration within Model Code Rule 503, which ad-
mitted any hearsay declaration if the declarant was unavailable as a wit-
ness and the statements would have been admissible had the witness
tution of the Norman inquest, from which the jury evolved, was revolutionary. It not
only substituted a rational investigation for a more or less superstitious ceremony, but it
removed the proceeding for the determination of the facts completely from the control of
the litigants.
51. 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1816, supra note 46 (3d ed. 1940).
52. The most prolific writer on this subject was Frank Swancara, who wrote a number of law
review articles, and one book, Obstruction of Justice by Religion, discussing the baleful impact of
religion on the trial process, including the oath. By the time Swancara's book was published in 1936,
there was no requirement that the witness swearing an oath believe in God, much less in a future
state of rewards or punishments, in order to testify as a witness. See, eg., McClellan v. Owens, 74
S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1934). The most recent case Swancara could find supporting the view that a
witness was incompetent unless he believed in God was State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39 (Me. 1921),
which itself was an oddity not followed by any other state. FRANK SWANCARA, OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE BY RELIGION 28 (1936). Cf CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE
CONsTrrUTIONS 107-11 (1965) (suggesting that witness incompetence due to a lack of belief in God
was largely discarded by the mid to late nineteenth century).
53. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1443, supra note 46 (3d ed. 1940).
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testified.54 Unlike the Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of
Evidence specifically adopted a dying declaration exception.55 It re-
quired proof only that the statement was made voluntarily and in good
faith. The latter requirement appears to be a secular version of the then
discredited requirement that the declarant hold a theological belief,
although there is nothing to indicate that the drafters intended that con-
struction. Rule 804(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence eliminated
the "good faith" requirement, and thus, any link to theological belief. 6
The Model Code of Evidence explicitly discussed evidence of reli-
gion in two places. First, the comment to Model Code Rule 106 con-
cerning attacks on credibility stated, "Evidence of race, alienage, or
theological belief is ordinarily irrelevant to credibility, but it may well
have some bearing on bias, interest or subjection to influence in a specific
case."57 Second, in the section entitled "Personal Privileges," Model
Code Rule 224 stated,
Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose his theological opin-
ion or religious belief unless his adherence or non-adherence to such an
opinion or belief is material to an issue in the action other than that of his
credibility as a witness. s
The comment to the rule indicated that the rule might be based on
an interpretation of state or federal constitutional rights protecting reli-
gious belief, and that Model Code Rule 224 had been adopted in more
states than were rules permitting attacks on a witness' credibility based
on her religious beliefs.59 Interestingly, the comment ended with the
statement that this Rule "does not affect the admissibility of evidence of
[religious beliefs] when relevant to credibility, if offered otherwise than
through questions to the witness."'
Consequently, the comment seems to imply that a jury's hearing
about the religious beliefs of a witness will not cause it to decide a case
irrationally; in other words, there is relatively little fear of evidence of
54. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942).
55. UNIF. . EVID. 63(5), 9A U.L.A. 636 (1953).
56. "While the original religious justification for the exception may have lost its conviction for
some persons over the years, it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are
present." FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) (Advisory Committee's Note).
57. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 106 cmt. c(3) (1942).
58. Id. at Rule 224.
59. Id. Some states, after abolishing laws requiring a belief in God to take an oath, permitted
the agnostic's credibility to be attacked on grounds of a lack of religious belief, which apparently was
indicative of a propensity to lie on the witness stand. By the late 19th century, however, the trend
was to prohibit such credibility attacks. See SWANCARA, supra note 52, at 65-74.
60. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 224 cmt. (1942).
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religion. This appears confirmed by the language of the Rule, which
grants a witness a privilege to refuse to disclose her religious beliefs. If
the witness chooses, she need not assert the privilege, and thus can speak
of her religious beliefs if she is convinced it will credit her testimony.
Thus, Model Code Rule 224 is limited to ensuring that a person's
"private" beliefs will be permitted to remain private against any efforts
to make them public. This notion that religious beliefs are "private,"
rather than "public" is part of the "rationalist" movement in Western
thought.61
In 1953, Model Code Rule 224 was adopted verbatim by the drafters
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 62 The entirety of the comment to the
Uniform Rule is, "This privilege adopts American Law Institute Model
Code of Evidence Rule 224 and is generally recognized either expressly
or in practice." 63
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 610
Federal Rule of Evidence 610, implemented in 1975, is a marked
change from the Model Code Rule. It forbids any evidence regarding a
witness' beliefs, whether offered to impair or enhance the credibility of
the witness. The rule is no longer framed in terms of protecting the indi-
vidual conscience of the witness, but is restructured in an attempt to ex-
clude religion from the courtroom. Two reasons for this change are
evident. First, in 1942, when the Model Code of Evidence was passed,
the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence was almost nonexis-
tent,64 while by 1971 the Court had exhausted itself in attempting to
61. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 ("Laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices."). This intelleftualization and compartmentalization of religion began in 18th century
America with the Deists, and continued to find favor in the 19th century with a number of main-
stream Protestant sects.
62. UNIF. R. EvWD. 30 (Commissioner's Note), 9A U.L.A. 618 (1953).
63. IdL
64. The most recent case as of 1942, and one which greatly influenced the subsequent develop-
ment of religion clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, was Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), which incorporated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the 1930s and the early 1940s, the entirety of the
Court's jurisprudence regarding religion resulted from the attempts of Jehovah's Witnesses to prose-
lytize without interference or regulation from local authorities. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938) (holding an ordinance requiring a permit to distribute religious tracts of the Jehovah's
Witnesses violative of the First Amendment). Notably, in protecting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
prosecution the Court usually used the Free Press and Free Speech Clauses to strike down the state
statutes and local ordinances, rather than the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Lastly,
the first "casebook" on church and state was not published until 1952, and then only in a prelimi-
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frame the constitutional contours of the establishment clause.65 Second,
the perceived general consensus concerning religion and public life (for
example, the "nondenominational" prayers said in all public schools)66
had disintegrated into a series of conflicts requiring the continuing atten-
tion of the Supreme Court. In 1952, Justice Douglas, in a rhetorical
flourish, said, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."'67 This presumed consensus did not represent all of
"the people," as later shown by the interminable disputes regarding in-
teractions between religion and government. The interdenominational
organizations and interfaith projects begun in earnest after World War II
covered only a part of the religious diversity of America.6" No longer
were challenges to the constitutionally-based relationship of religion and
public life initiated only by "fringe" groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses.
There is nothing in the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule
of Evidence 610 indicating that these tremendous societal 'and jurispru-
dential changes caused the Committee to restructure the Rule. Indeed,
there is only the comment that the rule does not apply to inquiries into a
witness' religious beliefs "for the purpose of showing interest or bias be-
cause of them...."69 Nevertheless, the tremendous increase in Supreme
Court cases structuring religion clause jurisprudence from 1947 makes it
plausible that the Advisory Committee considered it important to wash
nary edition. MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1952).
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ("Candor compels acknowledgment, moreover,
that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law. The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque,
particularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment." Id. at 612. "[Ihe line of
separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship." Id. at 614). Just as importantly, the Court found itself
in a morass concerning the constitutional limitations on civil litigation over church-owned property.
In Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
396 U.S. 367 (1970), the Court did not articulate "neutral principles" of law, that is, nonreligiously-
based principles of law, which could guide lower courts in determining who owned church property.
66. These prayers were declared unconstitutional by the Court in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962). See also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (holding constitutional the
expulsion of Jehovah's Witnesses schoolchildren from public schools for refusing to salute the Amer-
ican flag), overruled by West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Cf WILL
HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW 40-58 (1955) (attempting to show American consensus
without eliminating religious differences).
67. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). See also Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892) ("[N]o purpose of action against religion can be imputed to
any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.").
68. See MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 403-26 (1984).
69. FED. R. EVID. 610 (Advisory Committee's Note).
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their hands of evidence of religion. The resulting alteration in approach
makes Federal Rule of Evidence 610 a much more formal rule. The only
apparent exception to the bar on evidence of religion is showing a wit-
ness' bias or interest in the case because of her religious beliefs. The
application of such a formal rule requires little consideration of evidence
of religion. The goal of Federal Rule of Evidence 610 in avoiding evi-
dence of religion is the protection of the secular government, not the
protection of the parties' right to a fair trial or the protection of the con-
science of the individual witness-believer. This purpose comports with
the notion of "separation" between church and state fashioned by the
Supreme Court in the last forty years.
In The Garden and the Wilderness, Professor Mark De Wolfe Howe
compared the use of the "wall of separation" metaphor used by both
Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams.70 Jefferson, in an 1802 letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association, wrote that the First Amendment was
designed to build a wall of separation between church and state.7 1 Jeffer-
son's interpretation of the First Amendment "reflect[ed] the bias of
eighteenth-century rationalism."72 It was not surprising, then, Professor
Howe noted, that Jefferson "should have been taken to regard the First
Amendment as the safeguard of public and private interests against ec-
clesiastical depredations and excursions."73 The First Amendment was
designed more to protect the secular state from religion, rather than to
protect religious liberty. In contrast, when the seventeenth century reli-
gious seeker Roger Williams74 wrote that the church or garden should be
walled from the wilderness, it was because Williams feared "the worldly
corruptions which might consume the churches if sturdy fences against
70. MARK DE WOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-32 (1965).
71. 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (1903) (Letter of January 1, 1802) (quoted in
HOWE, supra note 70, at 1). The Court's interpretation of the religion clauses in the First Amend-
ment in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64, relies heavily on Jefferson's 1802 letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association to discern their meaning. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947) (assuming that the history of the First Amendment's Religion Clause is derived singly from
the battle for religious freedom fought in Virginia from 1776 to 1786, and conflating the thought of
Jefferson and Madison regarding religious liberty). Compare David Little, The Origins ofPerplexity:
Civil Religion and Moral Belief in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
(Russell G. Richey & Donald G. Jones eds., 1974) (contrasting the thought regarding religion of
Jefferson and Madison) with WILLS, supra note 17, at 363-80 (stressing similarities of the ideas of
Madison and Jefferson).
72. HOwE, supra note 70, at 2 (1965).
73. kI
74. An insightful portrayal of Roger Williams is found in WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST
LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 151-224 (1986).
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the wilderness were not maintained."7 Williams desired a wall to pro-
tect religion from secular depredations.
The Jeffersonian notion of fencing the barbarities or corruption of
religion from the secular realm of the state has dominated the thinking of
the Supreme Court since Everson v. Board of Education.76 The explicit
adoption of Jefferson's freighted metaphor by both the majority7 7 and the
dissent78 in Everson has framed mainstream legal thought about religion
clause jurisprudence. This commonly accepted view separates the consti-
tutional protection granted religion into two distinct clauses, each with
its own jurisprudence. The two religion clauses are perceived as devices
to separate religion and government in order to save government; further
related separations include such dichotomies as assuming that religion
exists in the realm of the irrational, while government (or law) is found in
the realm of the rational, and that religion is an individual's private af-
fair, concerned solely with the individual, and government is concerned
with the public affairs of society. Separating religion and government
enables government to remain secular; that is the primary goal to which
the religion clauses aspire. In its most protective sense, separation only
creates a negative liberty from a feared union of religion and government.
It does not create any positive liberty regarding individual conscience. 79
The retreat to formalism evidenced by the phrasing of Federal Rule
of Evidence 610 embodies that notion of separation. Rule 610 banishes
evidence of religion from the courtroom not because the result would
otherwise be that individual conscience would be infringed, but because
separation is the model for protecting government.80
75. HowE, supra note 70, at 6.
76. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra note 71.
77. Id. at 18 ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not
breached it here.").
78. Id at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Neither so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday
is the wall raised between church and state by Virginia's great statute of religious freedom and the
First Amendment ... ").
79. This has been most clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in its two most recent free
exercise cases: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). InLyng, the Court dismissed the free exercise claim
of the Native American plaintiffs because the development of the proposed road through land sacred
to the Native American religion did not "burden" their free exercise rights since they could still pray
there. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447-58. In Smith, the Court held that a constitutional claim of exemption
from a state law based on free exercise rights failed as long as the statute from which the claim for
exemption was made was a generally neutral statute. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600-02.
80. See also Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 Va. L.
Rev. 689, 693 n.12 (1968) (comparing the colonists' understanding of freedom and liberty meant a
freedom to serve God with the present view that "[t]oday, of course, 'freedom' means freedomfrom
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D. Commentary on Rule 610
There is little in the way of commentary explicating Federal Rule of
Evidence 610 in Weinstein's Evidence,8 Saltzburg & Martin's Federal
Rules of Evidence Manual8 2 or McCormick on Evidence."3  What little
commentary there is suggests only that the rule is too protective of reli-
gion. In an especially superficial editorial comment, Professors Saltzburg
and Martin write:
At first blush, Rule 610 appears to be so attuned to First Amendment
and privacy concerns that it is beyond criticism. We fear, however, that it
is overbroad. For example, if a fundamental tenet of a religion is that gov-
ernment is a false god that should be fought and not obeyed, a member of
the religious group might not be a trustworthy Witness. At a time when
religion and politics are difficult to separate, and when religious cults seem
to be proliferating, an absolute ban on evidence of membership may be too
broad.84
Faced with this comment, it is difficult to know where to begin. Ex-
amination of each statement made by Saltzburg and Martin illuminates
the shallow and/or irrational nature of their commentary. The explicit
assumption that Federal Rule of Evidence 610 is "attuned to the First
Amendment" evinces only a narrow understanding of the religion
clauses s.8  The further praise for the rule's concern for privacy seems
misplaced, since a huge exception permitting attacks based on bias or
interest is contemplated implicitly by the rule and explicitly by the Advi-
sory Committee's Note. 6 Next, the fear that some religions may teach
that "government is a false god that should be fought and not obeyed"
implicitly assumes that the primary harm of this "overbroad" rule will
religion and its restraints."). Cf HowE, supra note 70, at 15 (1965) ("The Court's refusal to ac-
knowledge that religious conviction as well as religious skepticism underlies our rule of separation
has, furthermore, made it needlessly difficult to explain the inclusion in the First Amendment of the
guarantee of religious liberty.").
81. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 610-1 to 610-9
(1988 & Supp. 1991). There is one page dedicated to FED. R. EVID. 610 in the most recent
Supplement.
82. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
UAL 681-83 (5th ed. 1990).
83. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 48 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
84. SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 82, at 681. Accord MOOR & BUSBY, supra note 22.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75 (discussing the First Amendment as a response to
18th century rationalism and as a means of protecting the state from ecclesiastical intrusion).
86. "While the rule forecloses inquiry into the religious beliefs or opinions of a witness for the
purpose of showing that his character to truthfulness is affected by their nature, an inquiry for the
purpose of showing interest or bias because of them is not within the prohibition." FED. R. EVID.
610 (Advisory Committee's Note).
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fall on the government; it fails to consider the harm that government
may do to others, or the harm individuals may do to religions outside the
mainstream of society. Present society's inability to (rationally?) sepa-
rate religion and politics is another reason for Saltzburg and Martin's
concern about the rule's breadth. 7 This reason also assumes that there is
either a need or a way to "separate" religion and politics in the present
United States. The final reason given by Saltzburg and Martin is based
on the fear that the proliferation of religious cults, unlike real religions,
may inculcate values antithetical to American society (who's irrational
now?).
E. An Example from Michigan Case Law
In most states, there are only scattered cases discussing the permissi-
bility of inquiring about a witness' religious beliefs. In Michigan, how-
ever, there is a series of cases which exemplify the shift from protecting
individual religious conscience to formally attempting to exclude religion
from the courtroom to protect the state. 88 Eventually, Michigan's "rule"
became a search for the intrusion of "religion" into the courtroom, lead-
ing to strained constructions of law.
In People v. Williams, 89 two witnesses for the defendant were asked
whether they believed in a Supreme Being and whether they would lie
under oath to protect the defendant. The Court of Appeals of Michigan
properly held this inquiry reversible error.90 Two years later, the
Supreme Court of Michigan, in People v. Hall, 91 evaluated a prosecutor's
inquiry into the strength of the defendant's religious beliefs, followed by
questions asking whether the defendant would lie. This was per se re-
versible error said the court, for otherwise this would lead to "the de-
87. Cf REICHLEY, supra note 39; NEUHAUS, supra note 39; and CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY,
PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION (1986) (all suggesting that reli-
gion is essential to informed public and political debate).
88. Early in Michigan's history the state supreme court held that Art. VI, § 34 of the Michigan
Constitution and § 4336 of the Compiled Laws of Michigan forbade all questions of a witness related
to her religious beliefs. People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 319 (1858). See also MICH. CONST. art. II,
§ 17 (1890) ("Competency of witness. No person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on
account of his opinions on matters of religious belief.") in ANI-EAU ET AL., supra note 52, at 201.
Subsequent cases (re-)interpreting this sensible position include People v. Williams, 197 N.W.2d 858
(Mich. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Hall, 215 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1974); People v. Bouchee, 253
N.W.2d 626 (Mich. 1977); People v. Poteat, 255 N.W.2d I (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); People v. Jones,
267 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Calloway, 427 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988); and People v. Calloway, 446 N.W.2d 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
89. People v. Williams, 197 N.W.2d 858, 859-61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
90. Id. at 862.
91. People v. Hall, 215 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1974).
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fendant being tried, convicted and punished on the nature of his religious
beliefs."92
The rule in Hall was restructured by the Court in People v.
Bouchee.93 The defendant, a married man, was accused of attempted
rape, and his defense was that the complainant consented by offering sex
in exchange for money. Bouchee testified that when he balked at the
price asked, he got out of the car and the complainant drove away.94
Bouchee also testified on direct examination that he was a church mem-
ber and regularly attended church, and strictly believed in the Bible. On
cross-examination, the prosecutor attacked Bouchee's defense by asking
whether the Bible condoned extramarital sexual intercourse. Bouchee's
character witness, the Reverend Amos Williams, was asked on cross-ex-
amination whether Bouchee was a religious man, to which the Rev. Wil-
liams responded by saying that Bouchee was a "Christian.""5 The court
held that the "rule" extended to "the instance in which a witness' reli-
gious opinions and beliefs are explored through the questioning of an-
other witness."96
The holding in Bouchee illuminates the paradox of mechanically ex-
cluding evidence of religion. Bouchee's defense was that he was more
credible than the complainant, in part because he was a God-fearing du-
tiful member of a church, and that he believed in strictly following the
commands of the Bible. His religious beliefs were offered to the jury as a
reason for the jury to acquit him. It was crucial for the prosecution to
attack Bouchee's (religious) credibility, especially when Bouchee called
his minister as a character witness. Apparently hypnotized by the idea
that religion could not be allowed in the courtroom, Michigan's Supreme
Court ignored the context of the events at trial, and reversed Bouchee's
conviction. The "separation" model thus resulted in the court ignoring
the fact that the initial reason for the rule was the protection of the de-
fendant/witness.
The shift was completed in People v. Poteat.97 There, the com-
plaining witness, a fifteen year old boy, testified that Poteat fellated him.
On cross-examination, the boy testified that later, he and the defendant
argued about the boy's Catholic beliefs, after which he left the defend-
92. Id. at 170.
93. 253 N.W.2d 626 (1977).
94. Id. at 628.
95. Id. at 631.
96. Id.
97. 255 N.W.2d I (Mich. Ct. App.), vacated, 282 N.W.2d 923 (Mich. 1977).
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ant's house. In the written opinion of the trial court, finding Poteat
guilty, the judge wrote that "I have to take into account also the religious
background [of complainant] and the necessity of truth saying which I
do take into account."98 The court of appeals reversed the conviction
"despite the fact that the defense counsel elicited this testimony," 99 be-
cause the court "expressly admit[ted] to being influenced to accept com-
plainant's version of the incident at least in part because of the
complainant's expressed religiosity.""' t° The notion that the constitu-
tional and statutory provisions protected the conscience of the witness
has disappeared; the purpose has been changed to protect the court from
any formal "religious" influence, which apparently is synonymous with
"irrational." The Supreme Court of Michigan agreed, concluding that
"the trial judge should not have considered, in his findings, the relation-
ship between witness' 'religious background and the necessity of truth
saying.' .101
People v. Jones, 102 decided the next year, concerned the effect of the
cross-examination of the defendant's character witness, the Reverend
Raymond Riggs. Jones' defense to the charge of felonious assault was
that he lacked intent because he had been drinking heavily. The Rev.
Riggs testified on direct examination about the defendant's church work,
as well as the church's requirement that members not drink alcohol. On
cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from the Rev. Riggs that the
church required periodic reaffirmation of its tenets, and asked whether
Jones' admission that he drank alcohol while reaffirming his adherence to
church tenets affected the reverend's opinion of the defendant's truth or
veracity.103 While this inquiry neither discussed the defendant's (nor the
witness') religious beliefs nor was directed at credibility (it was an
inquiry into the witness' opinion of the defendant's character), the con-
viction was reversed. The appellate court found that it was "not incon-
ceivable" that the jury might have been affected by the prosecutor's
cross-examination of the Rev. Riggs, and Jones was thereby preju-
diced."° Again, the reason was related more to cleansing the courtroom
of religion than protecting the conscience of the witness. Since Jones had
98. 255 N.W.2d at 1.
99. Id
100. Id
101. People v. Poteat, 282 N.W.2d 923, 923 (Mich. 1977).
102. 267 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
103. Id. at 435. The court erroneously believes this to be an attack on the defendant's credibil-
ity. Id. at 436.
104. Id at 437.
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introduced the issue of religion by calling the Rev. Riggs, the appellate
court could have concluded that defense counsel was required to mitigate
any damage done to Jones by questioning the Rev. Riggs on redirect.
This would better comport with notions of avoiding religious discrimina-
tion (and the possibility of an unfair trial) as well as notions of individual
conscience.
The issue in the final case, People v. Calloway," 5 was whether the
defendant's conviction should be reversed when a witness other than the
defendant answered affirmatively to the question whether she was a reli-
gious person. 10 6 The witness, Ola Mae Reed, was the separated wife of
the victim. Apparently, one defense was that Reed, not the defendant,
had killed her husband because he had left her to live with another wo-
man. Reed had argued with her husband shortly before he was mur-
dered, and had been seen in a blue van shortly after the murder.
Eyewitnesses heard shots which killed the victim and then saw a blue van
leaving the murder scene. Reed's testimony was that the blue van was
owned by the church she belonged to, and the prosecutor asked her
whether she was a religious person and how long she had been a member
of her church.10 7 The court of appeals reversed the conviction based on a
strict reading of Hall. 108 The Supreme Court of Michigan vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals. 10 9 On remand,
the court of appeals held that the Hall rule did not apply because "[fjirst,
the direct examination before and after the two brief questions which
were asked had no reference to 'opinions on the subject of religion.' Sec-
ondly, a fair reading of the testimony of Ola Reed indicates the questions
were part of a relevant inquiry about the witness' activities at the time of
the killing."' 110 While the question concerning Ola's presence in a blue
van was relevant to show she was not the killer, the question concerning
105. 427 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), vacated and remanded, 440 N.W.2d 414 (Mich.
1989), and aff'd, 446 N.W.2d 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
106. The entire colloquy was:
Q. Ola[,] are you a religious person?
A. Yes
Q. Okay. How long have you belonged to the church you go to now?
A. For nine years.
427 N.W.2d at 200.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 200. The court of appeals concluded that while the two questions asked had "no
bearing in determining the question of defendant's guilt," id at 201, it was bound by Hall to reverse
the conviction since a harmless error analysis was prohibited. The court of appeals urged the
Supreme Court of Michigan to reverse Hall. Id.
109. People v. Calloway, 440 N.W.2d 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
110. People v. Calloway, 446 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). The court of appeals
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whether Ola Mae Reed was a religious person certainly asks, albeit at a
broad level of generality, her opinions about religion. The refusal of the
court to so acknowledge is an effort to avoid the strict consequences of
their own misguided interpretation; again, the hope is that its interpreta-
tion will result in the exclusion of evidence of religion from the court-
room, rather than in the protection of the religious conscience of the
witness. The court makes no considered evaluation of the effect this evi-
dence would have on the trial.
The shift in legal thought about the interplay of religion and public
life, begun in constitutional law with the Supreme Court's decision in
Everson, is more narrowly exemplified in this series of Michigan cases.
The Supreme Court of Michigan originally focused on protecting the wit-
ness' religious beliefs from prosecutorial attack - the government was
not to use religious beliefs to persuade a jury to convict a defendant. As
permutations of this problem arose, the court shifted its focus to com-
pletely cleansing the courtroom of religion. The court did not address or
attempt to understand the contextual web which gave rise to this issue,
largely because the model of separation is unable to account for the vari-
ety of problems relating to evidence of religion in our courtrooms.
Protecting religious beliefs is one of the time-honored goals of the
First Amendment and comparable state constitutional provisions.
Achieving that goal by excluding religion from the courtroom or any
"public square" is a much more recent idea. The source for requiring
exclusion is the separationist approach. This approach, if applied as in
this series of cases from Michigan, does not result in a better way to
protect religious conscience, but simply results in a mindless exclusion of
religion from the public square.
Federal Rule of Evidence 610, and its Michigan counterpart, can
provide protection for those whose religious beliefs will place them at
odds with a jury. In that sense, just as the notion of separation enunci-
ated by Thomas Jefferson has value, Rule 610 has value. The problem is
that the surface sensibility of Rule 610 permits judges, lawyers and even
scholars to avoid looking beneath that surface, in order to challenge or
contemplate prevailing views about the connections among law, religion
and government in American society. This attempted return to a formal
separation of religion and law provided by Rule 610 blocks a continuing
search for both religiosity and law as Law; it just as surely does not end
that search. This directs us to our last three investigations regarding evi-
further held that the Hall rule mandating reversal of a conviction applied when any witness, not just
the defendant, was asked questions about her religious beliefs.
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dence of religion. In each, concerns for formal neutrality regarding reli-
gion lead to a blindness about religion.
IV. EVIDENCE OF RELIGION - THREE PARADIGM CASES
A. Wearing Clerical Garb at a Jury Trial
Working at a Legal Aid office in New York City, Father Vincent La
Rocca defended those accused of crimes. Before he could begin defend-
ing Cecilia Daniels in his first jury trial, the assistant district attorney
objected to Father La Rocca's wearing his collar symbolizing his status
as a Roman Catholic priest. The trial court ordered him to remove his
clerical collar before continuing the trial. Thus began a conflict about
which six decisions were written, I and from which several other opin-
ions were written distinguishing La Rocca's case.
La Rocca appealed the trial court's order, and requested the court
issue a writ of prohibition. Judge Mangano, as a reviewing court of one,
held that LaRocca's constitutional interest in wearing his clerical collar
required the issuance of the writ of prohibition.'" 2 Judge Mangano's
opinion made two points concerning the state's interests in preventing
Father La Rocca from wearing a clerical collar during a jury trial. First,
the state's presumption of jury bias or prejudice was inconsistent with the
assumption that jurors would decide cases based on the evidence. That
is, the general assumption that the jury would act rationally in deciding
the disputed facts at issue in a trial was undermined by the assumption
that a jury would act irrationally if a priest (and attorney) represented a
person accused of committing a crime. Additionally, to assume that a
questioning of the jury panelists during voir dire would not ferret out any
bias or prejudice also undermined generalized notions of rational deci-
sionmaking by the jury. Neither of these assumed propositions could
override the more fundamental assumption made about jury decision-
making. Second, if the state's fear was that "religious" attorneys would
impermissibly create jury bias or prejudice, a decision barring a priest
from wearing a clerical collar would solve only a small part of the prob-
111. La Rocca v. Lane, 353 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975), and cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976); People v. Rodri-
guez, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Gold v. McShane, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504
(App. Div.), and appeal dismissed, 431 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1980); La Rocca v. Gold, 662 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1981).
112. La Rocca v. Lane, 353 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) [hereinafter the subsequent
history of the case will be given only when necessary to explain the case; otherwise the citation will
be only to the opinion under discussion].
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lem. It would do nothing to prevent a religiously devout "lay" attorney
from representing clients, even when the jurors had independent knowl-
edge of that attorney's religious devotion. In addition, the decision con-
cerning La Rocca would affect all attorneys, not just Roman Catholic
priests, who wear some visible symbol emblematic of their religious faith
while trying a case.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York reversed. It suggested that three issues were present: 1) the right of
the defendant to counsel of her choice; 2) La Rocca's right to wear the
collar of the Roman Catholic priest before a jury; and 3) the power of the
court to regulate an attorney's dress.1 13 In the court's opinion, the first
issue was easily resolved because Ms. Daniels was officially represented
by the Legal Aid Society, and not Father La Rocca. Her formal right to
counsel was satisfied - she had no right to be represented by Father La
Rocca. The court addressed the two remaining issues together, as if they
were one.
The court began its discussion of Father La Rocca's right to wear
his clerical collar by stressing the limitations of the free exercise of reli-
gion. One's freedom of religion was "not altogether beyond regulation
by the State," '1 14 and the court adopted the formal belief/action distinc-
tion of Reynolds v. United States 11 regarding state regulation. The argu-
ment that La Rocca was required by his Bishop to wear his collar was
brushed aside by the court with the response that La Rocca's dress was
"regulated by the court only when he is performing his duties as an attor-
ney in a trial before a jury. The court did not undertake to prohibit him
from wearing the clerical collar as a spectator, as a witness, or as a
party." '116 The interest of the state in a fair trial, by contrast, was para-
mount to the administration of justice, and "a fair trial is linked closely
to the conduct of the attorneys appearing in the trial."' 1 7 The rule was
not too onerous because "it is directed against him only when he tries
cases before a jury and requires him only to doff his clerical collar."' 18
Finally, the court's regulation of LaRocca's dress was reasonable because
[wihen he appears in court, he is not acting as a priest. This does not mean
that he gives up his religious beliefs or his priestly duties when he acts as an
113. La Rocca v. Lane, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (App. Div. 1975).
114. Id. at 459.
115. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
116. La Rocca v. Lane, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 460.





attorney; it does mean, however, that when he enters on secular pursuits he
is subject to reasonable regulations in the secular realm." 9
The court is unable to perceive religion in any other way than
through Jefferson's separationist lens. It assumes, without reliance on
any empirical support, that a fair trial is made nearly impossible if the
attorney for the criminal defendant is a priest. It also assumes that the
simple physical act of removing a collar will have little effect on Father
La Rocca, thus failing to contemplate that notions of conscience bar
many from undertaking seemingly simple physical acts. Finally, it as-
sumes, consonant with the separation model, that there are distinct pub-
lie and private spheres, and religion operates only in the private sphere.
To assume that when La Rocca appears in court he is not acting as a
priest means that the state, through the court, has, contrary to the idea of
separation, adopted a theological view not shared by all in society. 120
The court decided that while a judicious use of voir dire might result
in an unbiased jury, it would be impossible to conclude so definitively. In
any event, a fair trial required the appearance of a fair trial, and attempt-
ing to eliminate bias or prejudice by use of voir dire questioning was le-
gally insufficient.
Again, the assumption is that the jury might not tell the truth when
questioned about the effect of Father La Rocca's collar on their decision-
making ability, and so the possibility of irrational action by the jury re-
quired a solution impairing La Rocca's free exercise of religion. The
formal requirement of the appearance of a fair trial (which realistically
might be denied if another attorney was required to replace La Rocca)
outweighed any substantive concerns. The retreat into formalism is a
119. Id. at 462. This is the'same line of reasoning developed in Mexico after the revolution of
the late 1800s and early 1900s. The idea of separation of church and state in Mexico prohibits
Catholic priests and nuns from wearing their religious habits in public. Matt Moffett, In Catholic
Mexico, A Priest's Power Is Limited to Prayer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1989, at Al. On November 1,
1991, in his annual State-of-the-Union address, Mexico President Carlos Salinas de Gortari proposed
a constitutional amendment legalizing the status of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico. See
Marjorie Miller, Mexico Acts to Legitimize Shunned Catholic Church, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1991, at
Al.
120. See EEOC v. Townley Efng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 624-25 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan,
J., dissenting) (noting that a governmental decision sharply dividing what is "secular" from what is
"religious" is itself a theological position which the First Amendment forbids), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1077 (1989). See also John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs.
23, 28-31 (1949) (Murray, a well known American Jesuit philosopher, concluding that the Madis-
onian concept of separation, adopted in the Everson case, is grounded in "a sectarian idea of reli-
gion."). "[]f there is one thing that the First Amendment forbids with resounding force it is the
intrusion of a sectarian philosophy of religion into the fundamental law of the land." Id. at 30.
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consequence of the reliance upon notions of separation absent counter-
vailing ideas of liberty of conscience.
The decision of the Appellate Division was affirmed by the New
York Court of Appeals.121 After a lengthy foray into the appropriateness
of the nature of La Rocca's request for relief, the court, relying on the
decision of the Appellate Division, indicated that some persons would
attach greater credit to the statements of a member of the clergy than
"others." 2 This was "understandable, but not condonable."' 23 Some
jurors might discredit La Rocca because of their religious prejudices,
which would deny the defendant a fair trial. The court was charged with
the responsibility of ensuring a fair trial, and a refusal by the defendant
to object was of no consequence. Additionally, the requirement of a fair
trial applied to both the defendant and the state, and the risk of an unfair
trial "outweighed this incidental limitation." '24
The Court of Appeals showed the same lack of concern for La
Rocca's religious liberty interests as had the Appellate Division. The
Court of Appeals went further, however, by linking the fear of an unfair
trial to the state's interest in convicting Ms. Daniels. The historical fear
necessitating a "fair trial" was the power of the state in prosecuting indi-
viduals and depriving them of their liberty. This fear is flipped by the
court, so that the due process protections guaranteed the individual are
used to "protect" the state from the insidious influence of a criminal de-
fense attorney's clerical collar.
La Rocca's petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of certiorari was denied. 2 ' This did not end La Rocca's attempts to
wear his clerical collar.
In 1978, La Rocca, still employed as an attorney with the Legal Aid
Society of New York, began representing Anna Rodriguez, who was
charged with the criminal sale of marijuana. La Rocca made an applica-
tion to the court to wear his clerical garb while defending Ms. Rodriguez
at the jury trial, which was denied. La Rocca made the same application
121. La Rocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975).
122. Id. at 613.
123. Id.
124. Id. This reasoning would allow the court to exclude attorneys on the basis of the possible
prejudice of prospective jury members to the attorney. Consequently, attorneys who are women or
members of a racial or ethnic minority could also be excluded from representing defendants in crimi-
nal trials. Cf Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (rejecting company's
reliance on customer preference for female flight attendants as basis for excluding males from those
positions), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
125. La Rocca v. Lane, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
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before a different judge of the Criminal Term of the Supreme Court of
New York. The court, concluding that the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in McDaniel v. Paty 26 allowed it to revisit La Rocca v. Lane, held
that forbidding La Rocca from wearing his clerical collar substantially
burdened La Rocca's free exercise of religion. 2 7 This burden was not
required by any compelling state interest, the court concluded, for the
assumption that society (and juries) manifested a fixed awe of members
of the clergy resulting in a bias preventing a fair trial was not based on
any empirical data. The court also found that the assumption that voir
dire would not assist the court in ensuring a fair trial of the case also was
based solely on speculation. 2
The Criminal Term court also analogized two other New York
cases. In Close-It Enterprises, Inc. v. Weinberger, 29 the New York Ap-
pellate Division reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that
the defendant was forced to choose between attending the trial and re-
moving his yarmulke, or wearing his yarmulke and absenting himself
from the trial. This choice impermissibly burdened the free exercise
rights of the defendant. According to the Appellate Division, Close-It
Enterprises presented a much different case than La Rocca v. Lane be-
cause the latter case "involved an attorney who was also a priest and who
desired to represent a defendant in a criminal case while attired in his
clerical garb."130 This reasoning assumes, without attempting to per-
suade, that there is a constitutional difference between a party and an
attorney. It might be argued that a constitutional difference exists be-
cause a party has a right to enter the court system, while the lawyer has
only a privilege to do so, but the right/privilege distinction in constitu-
tional law has been discarded for years.' 3 ' It may also be that a constitu-
tional difference exists because Weinberger was a defendant who was
126. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 143-78.
127. People v. Rodriguez, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), rev'd sub nor . Gold v.
McShane, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 431 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1980).
128. 424 N.Y.S.2d at 604, 606-07.
129. 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1978). Three early Pennsylvania cases decided by its
Supreme Court may be relevant. In Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (1793), the court accepted
dismissal of a case fining a Jew named Jonas Phillips for refusing to testify in court on a Saturday. In
Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155 (1828), it held that excluding a juror whose reli-
gious beliefs led him to disavow capital punishment was not error, and three years later in Simon's
Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (1831), held proper a denial of a continuance because one
plaintiff refused to testify on his Sabbath.
130. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
131. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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haled into court against his will, while La Rocca voluntarily choose to
practice law as a trial lawyer. Neither of these arguments was advanced
by the court, however. Clearly, the only acknowledged difference was
simply that Weinberger was a party while La Rocca was an attorney, 132
for "any potential prejudice could have been taken care of through the
voir dire and the court's instructions to the jury." 133
The second analogous case, according to the Criminal Term of the
Supreme Court, was the officially unreported case of People v. Rami-
rez, 34 in which the state successfully opposed the criminal defendant's
motion to prevent a prosecution witness, a Roman Catholic priest, from
wearing his clerical collar. 131 In granting La Rocca's application, the
court concluded that an attorney's religious dress was less likely to affect
the jury than the religious dress of parties.
This decision was reversed in four short paragraphs by the Appel-
late Division. In its memorandum decision, the Appellate Division held
that there was no change of circumstances which permitted Judge
McShane in People v. Rodriguez to rule contrary to the decision in La
Rocca v. Lane. 136 The appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was
132. If there was a legal difference between a civil and a criminal trial requiring a distinction
between the two cases, the Close-It Enterprises court did not address the distinction.
133. Close-It Enterprises, Inc. v. Weinberger, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
134. Cited in People v. Rodriguez, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600, 607 (Ramirez was noted in the September
11, 1979 issue of the New York Law Journal).
135. In People v. Drucker, 418 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Crim. Ct. 1979), a defense motion to bar the
alleged victim, an Episcopalian priest, from wearing his clerical collar when testifying was denied.
The court obliquely criticized the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in La Rocca v. Lane,
stating that "Chief Judge Breitel's decision does not demonstratively deal with the alternative of the
voir dire or the charge to the jury in the case of the attire of a witness." Id. at 747. The opinion in
People v. Rodriguez did not cite to People v. Drucker. Cf Nun's Habit Raises Controversy in Trial,
BosToN GLOna, Mar. 16, 1987, at 7, in which it was reported that a judge in the Philadelphia Court
of Common Pleas forbade Sister Ann Colleen Dougherty, a Roman Catholic nun and the sister of
the murder victim, from wearing her religious habit at the trial of the four men accused of her
brother's murder. See also In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978) (a spectator wearing a takia (a
prayer cap required to be worn by orthodox Sunni Muslims) in the courtroom did not threaten
public order, and order to remove takia violated the Free Exercise Clause); McMillan v. State, 265
A.2d 453 (1970) (reversing criminal contempt citation of a member of a religious sect known as
Ujamma who refused to take off his filaas in court); O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863,
869 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) (distinguishing La Rocca on grounds that priest who asked to represent
himself in civil case was not a lawyer, that banning such clerical garb would prejudice the jury by
suggesting that the court doubted that he was in fact a priest, and that objections could be cured by
jury instructions). See also Frankel v. Roberts, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that
an attorney has a First Amendment right to wear a "Ready to Strike" button on her lapel at trial,
and finding La Rocca inapplicable).
136. Gold v. McShane, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 431 NY.S.2d
1033 (1980).
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dismissed for lack of a substantial constitutional question.'37
The final chapter in this saga is the Second Circuit's decision in La
Rocca v. Gold. 138 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, faced with La Rocca's claim that his constitutional right to
freely exercise religion was violated by the district attorney's actions,
held that the issue was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.'39
In dicta, however, the court distinguished the Close-It Enterprises and
Drucker cases. Lawyers, as officers of the court, were different from wit-
nesses and parties because part of the jury's duty is to evaluate the credi-
bility of witnesses and parties, but "[t]he jury should have no need to
judge the lawyer's credibility."'" Close-It Enterprises also was distin-
guishable because no one objected to Weinberger wearing a yarmulke,
and Drucker was distinguishable because either a) the credibility of the
priest, as the alleged victim, was at issue, or b) the decision in Drucker
did not represent the law of the state.
14
'
We know by now that attacking or supporting the credibility of a
witness based on the witness' religious beliefs is impermissible, so the
argument distinguishing Close-It Enterprises by arguing that the jury
should know about the religiosity of the witnesses and parties to assess
their credibility is completely repudiated by the law of evidence.' 42 Sec-
ond, the requirement that there be a "fair trial" was the responsibility of
the court, not the parties, and therefore, the failure of the opposing party
to object to Weinberger wearing a yarmulke is legally irrelevant to a
court determination of the likelihood of a fair trial. Finally, the Second
Circuit's purported distinctions of the Drucker case, that is, that wearing
a collar was relevant to the issue of the witness' credibility, has already
been shown as fallacious. The court's alternative reason gives no sound
explanation why Drucker is not good law.
The unwillingness to discuss the merits of Father La Rocca's claim,
except in dicta, is a refusal to seriously examine the meaning of religious
liberty. This refusal becomes more difficult to understand given the
137. Gold v. McShane, 431 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1980).
138. 662 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1981).
139. Id. at 148.
140. Id. at 149.
141. Id. at 150.
142. See People v. Valdivia, 485 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that a fleeting and
"relatively neutral" cross-examination concerning the witness' religious beliefs was harmless error);
People v. Wood, 488 N.E.2d 86, 88 (N.Y. 1985) ("[A]ny attempt to discredit or otherwise penalize a




Supreme Court's intervening decision in McDaniel v. Paty. 14 The Court
held that Tennessee could not bar the Reverend Paul McDaniel, an or-
dained minister, from sitting as a delegate to a state constitutional con-
vention in order to foster a more complete separation of church and
state. Tennessee proposed that a statute disqualifying clergy from partic-
ipating in the framing of its constitution protected the state's compelling
interest in preventing an establishment of religion.t" Although the justi-
fications for the decision varied,14 the Court unanimously held that Ten-
nessee could not bar McDaniel from participating in the constitutional
convention. McDaniel's status as a minister did not cut him off from
public life or issues, and any attempt by the state to do so failed to con-
sider the impact on McDaniel's religious liberty to engage in the exercise
of his religion. Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, noted that
freedom to believe encompassed a freedom to act on those beliefs, "even
including doing so to earn a livelihood."'146
The story of Father Vincent La Rocca is similar to the Reverend
McDaniel's story. While La Rocca's religious beliefs were not impaired
by the rules forbidding him from wearing his clerical collar while defend-
ing a woman accused of a crime before a jury of her peers, the question
was whether La Rocca's constitutional right to exercise his religious be-
liefs was infringed by the state's action. The decisions prohibiting La
Rocca from wearing clerical garb at trial were premised on the formal
belief/action distinction first stated in 1879 in Reynolds v. United
States. 47 This belief/action distinction had been limited in 1940, in
Cantwell v. Connecticut. 14 The Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Paty pro-
hibited Tennessee from barring McDaniel from a constitutional conven-
tion solely because McDaniel was an ordained minister. Tennessee's
143. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
144. Id. at 621.
145. A plurality, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, held that this law infringed McDaniel's
exercise of religion, and that the state's interest was not compelling. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at
626. A concurrence by Justice Brennan concluded that the Tennessee law violated McDaniel's free-
dom of belief. Id. at 630. Justice Stewart separately concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. at
642. Justice White concluded that McDaniel's exercise of religion was not infringed, but the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 643.
146. Id at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
147. 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) ("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opin-
ion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order."). The Court was relying upon Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, which
made the same opinion/action distinction. Id. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
148. 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("Thus the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts, - free-




actions discriminated against McDaniel because his religious beliefs led
him to assume the status of minister in society. La Rocca's religious
beliefs, like McDaniel's, led him to assume the status of priest, as one
whose religious beliefs led him to embrace God differently than do many
of the rest of us. This difference is eradicated by the New York courts in
the name of a pervasive secularism. La Rocca must set aside his priestly
status if he also intends to act as an attorney. His acts as a lawyer are
deemed to be in the secular world, something apart from the private,
religious world.14 9
B. Religious Belief and Jury Decisionmaking
The defendant, Leland DeMille, was charged with murder in the
second degree. During the closing argument, DeMille's attorney failed
to look at one of the jurors. When the jury began deliberating, this juror
told the other members of the jury that she had prayed to God for a sign
regarding DeMille's guilt, and had received a revelation from God that
DeMille was guilty if defense counsel did not look her in the eye during
closing argument. DeMille was convicted. 150
In support of his motion for a new trial, DeMille requested the trial
court to consider an affidavit of another juror relating the news of this
divine revelation. The trial court refused to consider it, citing Utah Rule
of Evidence 606(b)."' The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed DeMille's
conviction.
The court's affirmance was based on several related reasons. First,
to hold that reliance upon responses to prayer are "outside influences"
within the meaning of Rule 606(b) might improperly create a religious
test for serving on a jury, which would infringe the religious liberties of
149. Cf THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FArTH AND THE PROFESSIONS 71-110 (1987) (discussing
whether there can be a separation of private and public morality).
150. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988). See also Daniel S. Day, Note, Utah Rule of
Evidence 606(b). Is God an Improper Outside Influence?, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 969. DeMille was fol-
lowed by the Court of Appeals of Utah in State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422,427 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
151. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or
to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's atten-
tion or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about
which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
UTAH R. EVID. 606(b) differs from FED. R. EVID. 606(b) only in the substitution of gender neutral
terms ("the juror") for "him" and "his."
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prospective jurors. In support of this argument, the court noted that
"[p]rayer is almost certainly a part of the personal decision-making pro-
cess of many people, a process that is employed when serving on a
jury."" '2 Second, the affidavit produced no facts which indicated that the
juror who had received the divine revelation was disqualified because she
was "unable to fairly consider the evidence and properly apply the
law."1 3 Lastly, even if the affidavit had showed that the juror was inca-
pable of deciding the case on the evidence adduced at trial, DeMille was
precluded under Rule 606(b) from arguing that the juror was "incompe-
tent" after the verdict had been rendered. Instead, ensuring that the ju-
ror would base her decision on the evidence was properly raised only
during jury voir dire. 154
Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter, argued that while "a juror may
seek guidance through prayer in reaching a decision, and courts have so
recognized," ' verdicts decided on some basis other than the evidence
introduced in court and the law applied to the case made "the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to trial by jury a nullity." 116 The constitutional
difference was whether the juror received divine guidance in assessing the
evidence (permissible) or whether the juror received divine indications of
the correct decision (impermissible).157 Identification of this difference
requires an assumption that there is a rational/irrational boundary which
was crossed by the juror who relied on a sign from God in ascertaining
DeMille's guilt. 5 At the very least, Justice Stewart will permit the de-
fendant's lawyer to grill the juror about whether and to what extent she
used her religious beliefs in making her decision about DeMille's guilt.
The result, under Justice Stewart's approach, is that the truth or validity
of the juror's beliefs would be on trial, an approach which is inconsistent
with religious liberty.15 9 In Justice Stewart's view, a trial court would be
152. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d at 84.
153. Id. at 85.
154. Id.
155. Id (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Rocco, 579 P.2d 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), and
State v. Graham, 422 So. 2d 123 (La. 1982), appeal dismissed, 461 U.S. 950 (1983)).
156. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d at 85.
157. Id at 85-86.
158. But see THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935); JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, (1930); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) (realist
writings all concluding that trial by jury is irrational in its very execution). See also Ariens, supra
note 44 (discussing historical challenge to rationality of adjudication made by legal realists); MILNER
S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 42-63 (1981) (discussing the idea of courts as theaters).
Cf JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102, 374-77 (1949) (suggesting that the administration of
justice would benefit by moving from a "fight" theory of dispute resolution toward a "truth" theory).
159. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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required to decide, after making a factual inquiry into the decisionmak-
ing processes of the juror, whether that juror used divine guidance to
(rationally) assess the evidence in the case or whether the juror imper-
missibly (irrationally) decided the case based on a revelation from
God.16°
Foraging through the beliefs of a juror to assess the extent to which
religion influences her clearly violates liberty of conscience. In essence,
her religious conscience will be protected only if religious conscience
does not matter to society. Praying to God for guidance in assessing the
evidence is apparently constitutional because, in the final analysis, God
remains remote. God does not interfere with the juror's "rational" pro-
cess of deciding according to the evidence - God simply enables the
juror to use better her (own?) reasoning facilities. The secular right to a
trial by jury is consequently not invaded by religion. On the other hand,
a juror who votes to convict because she states that God revealed to her
the defendant's guilt is, according to Justice Stewart, acting irrationally
because Justice Stewart has concluded that she is relying solely and im-
permissibly on God rather than on the (secular) evidence. Her decision
then must deprive the defendant of a right to a (secular) trial by jury.
There is the assumption that we know the difference in decisionmaking
by one who prays and one who receives a revelation. This knowledge
itself assumes a particular religious belief. This invasive God, if we can
assume that God actually spoke to her, must be cabined, must be re-
moved from the legal system and the jury. God must be removed by
reversing the conviction and removing the juror. The boundary between
rational and irrational becomes the boundary between secular and
religious. 161
The majority accepts the dissent's rational/irrational, secular/reli-
gious distinction. It affirms only because it concludes that the divine rev-
elation was in effect an aid to the juror's rational assessment of the
evidence rather than a command to be obeyed, and because a narrowly
textual reading of Rule 606(b) forbade the admissibility of the affidavit.
The majority wishes to limit issues of evidence of religion to the voir dire
160. Cf 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, at § 30 n.5 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983):
For our own part, we are inclined to believe that the effort to state systematically and
comprehensively the premises on which our inferences rest may produce serious distor-
tions in the factfinding process in part (but only in part) because such systematic state-
ment obscures the complex mental processes that we actually employ and should employ
to evaluate evidence. It is not true that we can say all we know, and the effort to say
more than we are able to say is likely to diminish our knowledge and our ability to use it.
161. See Paul J. Zwier, God, Man, and Jury, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 33.
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of the prospective jurors; 162 it implicitly assumes that relying on revela-
tions from God would be irrational, violating the rights of the defendant.
The tone of the majority is a wish that religion would just go away.
The issue of religion and its influence on jury decisionmaking is not
the primary focus of either opinion. Instead, the focus of the majority is
ensuring the finality of jury verdicts, and the focus of the dissent is the
due process right of the defendant to a trial by a secularized jury. Each
separates religion from secular concerns, assuming a legal necessity for
such action, and a society's (jury's) ability to do so.
Further, neither opinion discusses whether there exists a congruence
between rational decisionmaking and truthful decisionmaking. While
the Note discussing this case concludes by asserting that "the jury is a
rational truthfinder,"' 63 and thus that religious influences may not be
permitted in jury deliberations, neither opinion in DeMille resorts to
Wigmore's view that a trial is a search for truth." Both instead appear
to be searching for ways to create the appearance of impartiality, so dis-
putes can be "resolved" "peacefully" within the legal system, rather than
resolved "violently" outside it. The court shies away from noting that
many Americans believe that insights from religion may speak to "truth"
as well as (if not better than) anything else. Since truth is not the explic-
itly stated goal of adjudication, but "rational" decisionmaking is, the
court can conclude that religious insights are irrelevant.' 65
The problem, of course, is the extent to which our system of justice
requires juries to decide cases rationally. Before the jury venire is win-
nowed and a jury panel seated, prospective jurors are questioned by
either the trial court, the attorneys for the parties or both.1 66 Prospective
162. The majority cites State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1984), in which it held that, at
a trial for driving while intoxicated, a prospective juror can be asked whether his personal or reli-
gious beliefs led him to abstain from drinking alcohol. While Ball supports the majority's decision to
limit questions of religious belief to voir dire, the majority fails or refuses to consider the implications
for protecting the religious liberty of prospective jurors. It is difficult to see any resting place down
the slippery slope.
163. Day, supra note 150, at 989. Contra supra note 158.
164. See 1 WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE, supra note 46, at § 8e (3d ed. 1940) ("[r]ules of evidence
should be so devised as to facilitate the ascertainment of truth"). See also Ariens, supra note 44
(tracing the notion of truth as the goal of adjudication and the law of evidence.).
165. One may speculate whether the judges' own religious beliefs led them to opposing conclu-
sions, although each opinion was apparently based on the same premises. Their religious beliefs may
have influenced their views regarding the truth of divine revelation, and thus the result appropriate
in this case. It is clear that the Note takes a skeptical view of the existence or truth of divine
revelations. See Day, supra note 150, at 983, 989 (discussing "So-called 'revelation'" and "some
supposedly divine sign").
166. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(a).
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members of the jury are screened for their knowledge of the case, their
acquaintance with the parties and attorneys, and their relevant biases and
prejudices, and may be challenged for cause or stricken through the
available peremptory challenges given each party.16 7 Before the parties'
opening statements, the jury is often cautioned that it is to base its deci-
sion fairly and impartially on the evidence which they are about to hear.
The jury will be instructed at the close of the trial that their decision
must be based on the evidence presented at the trial and the instructions
of law given by the judge.16
At the same time, the secrecy of jury deliberations is a staple of the
American system of justice. The jury decides in a room closed to anyone
else.169 Once a jury decides a case, its decision, no matter how well or
poorly reasoned, is impervious to most attacks.170  The appeals to ra-
tional decisionmaking end once the jury begins its deliberations. 171
This suggests an alternative to this rational/irrational distinction. A
jury's decisions, no matter how made, may be viewed as nonrational,
rather than as either rational or irrational. Professor Zwier suggests that,
broadly speaking, all jury decisions are nonrational and "religious. ' 172
Professor Tillers, in his imaginative and insightful revision of volumes 1
and 1A of Wigmore on Evidence, 73 suggests that modern theories of rele-
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1989) lists the number of peremptory challenges in federal civil cases;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) lists the number of peremptory challenges in federal criminal cases. Cf
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that racially motivated peremptory challenges by
the state violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89 (1991) (applying Batson to all civil cases).
168. See EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS §§ 71.02, 71.03 (3d ed. 1977) (civil cases) and §§ 11.03, 11.11 (3d ed. 1977) (criminal
cases).
169. Cf State v. Rocco, 579 P.2d 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that entry for less than one
minute of alternate juror into jury deliberation room to "say a prayer with the jurors" before she left
did not violate defendant's constitutional rights).
170. See WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1990, at B7 (reporting reversal by federal district court of con-
viction of two savings & loan officials because jurors, during deliberations, discussed the indictment
of another well-known savings & loan operator, whose name had been mentioned frequently at the
trial).
171. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365-72
(1978) (discussing whether adjudication can be meaningful if the decision is not reached "ration-
ally," which Fuller interprets to include "inarticulate" or "intuitive" decisions which appear to be
rational if they could be rationally expressed). This paper was first written twenty years earlier, and
excerpts were printed in HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 420-26 (tent. ed. 1958).
172. Zwier, supra note 161, at 440. While I don't agree with Professor Zwier's definition of
"religion," I agree with his conclusion that jury decisionmaking is not "rational," because it is
nonfoundational reasoning.
173. 1 & IA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983).
19921
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
vance must redefine "rational" decisionmaking.1 74
We believe that rational evaluation can remain rational even though the
process employs presuppositions and processes that remain implicit, and
there is no need to force a choice between explicit and implicit inferential
processes since it is quite sensible to think that rational evaluations may
involve both implicit and explicit processes. To demand that everything be
made explicit is to foreordain the failure of reason since the demands we
make on reason are too great and hence impossible to satisfy.175
In either case, the opinions in State v. DeMille must be reconciled
with a recategorization of secular/religious, and rational/irrational. The
"improper" or "inappropriate" 176 use of religion may be for a juror (or
court) to discriminate against others who are of different or antagonistic
faiths. 177 It would not encompass a juror's "reliance" on divine revela-
tion in voting to convict or acquit. The difference here is the notion of
good faith. In the DeMille case, there is no question about the juror's
good faith. 178 Instead, it is a question of the validity of her relying upon
her religious faith. The implicit assumption of both DeMille opinions is
that religious faith cannot be trusted if it fails to comport with secular
notions of rational thinking. In other words, unless religious faith fits
into judicial conceptions of proper decisionmaking, it must be excluded
from secular society. In a case in which jurors make their decisions
based on the religious faith of a party or witness, good faith is absent.
Religious liberty is respected and protected when a juror's religious
beliefs are protected from post-hoc interrogations - religious pluralism is
174. Id at § 37.
175. Id. at § 37.4.
If it may be assumed, as we do, that factfinding can be "rational" even though no tran-
scendental basis exists that determines the appropriate classification, characterization or
dissection of evidence, it seems probable that rational inquires into the nature and impli-
cations of evidence and facts is advanced when the trier persists, insofar as possible, in
the effort to determine whether the characterization, interpretation, dissection, and so
on, of the evidence that he has adopted is in fact a truly meaningful dissection and
characterization (from his point of view) in the light of the assumptions and beliefs he
entertains (both of a general character as well as of the general constitution of the whole
of the evidence before him).
Id at § 37.7.
176. See Day, supra hote 150 (arguing, without defining, that a certain kind or form of "reli-
gious" influence would be improper or inappropriate).
177. See, eg., United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971
(1984). See also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. Indeed, this differentiates the DeMille case from jury decisions based on throwing dice. Sce
William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 MoD. L. REV. 261, 274 (1984) (citing New York
Law Journal's April 17, 1983 edition which reported the case of Judge Alan Friess in New York
doing just that to decide a case).
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not respected nor protected when decisions are based on antagonism to
another's beliefs. A method of deciding cases by placing one's faith in
God to make a decision is difficult to accept because it is explicitly nonra-
tional. It does, however, promote an important value in American soci-
ety, one important enough to be constitutionally protected. A juror who
decides a case because a party's religious beliefs are contrary to the ju-
ror's is not acting in the interest of religious liberty and pluralism. This
decision is more irrational than nonrational, but more importantly, it is
also inappropriate because it deforms religious pluralism. This method
of decisionmaking is instead a form of religious discrimination, which the
Constitution forbids.
C. Judging and Religious Beliefs
The final issue to be addressed is the impact of religion on judging.
Professor Stephen Carter's recent essay explores the permissibility,
within liberal political theory, of using one's religious beliefs to judge.17 9
Carter concludes that if morally sensitive judges are necessary to a sys-
tem of justice, then a religiously devout judge may make decisions based
on her religious beliefs. My intention here is to compare two cases, Colo-
rado v. Connelly "I and State v. Lafferty, "I which offer markedly differ-
ent views about the "rationality" of persons accused of crimes, based
seemingly on the different religious influences permeating the judges'
thoughts.
Francis Connelly approached a police officer in downtown Denver
in August of 1983, and stated that he had murdered a person and wanted
to talk about it. After immediately being advised of his Miranda rights,
and after further questioning by a police officer "bewildered by this con-
fession," Connelly stated that he wanted to talk because his conscience
had been bothering him."8 2
After the arrival of a homicide detective, Connelly stated that he
had killed a young girl named Mary Ann Junta the previous year. The
next day he stated that he had followed the direction of "voices" in con-
fessing. At a hearing to suppress his statements, psychiatrist Jeffrey
Metzner testified that Connelly told him that on the day before he ap-
proached the police officer, the "voice of God" told him to withdraw
money from a bank, fly from Boston to Denver, and either confess to the
179. Carter, supra note 25.
180. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
181. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
182. 479 U.S. at 160.
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killing or commit suicide. "Reluctantly following the command of the
voices," '183 Connelly confessed. The psychiatrist testified that Connelly
was experiencing command hallucinations which interfered with his abil-
ity to make rational and free choices. The Colorado trial and supreme
courts suppressed the confessions.
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. It held that since the police had not engaged in any coercive
activity, there was no predicate which required the court to assess the
"voluntariness" of the confession.184 In conclusion, the Court held that
Connelly's "perception of coercion flowing from the 'voice of God,' how-
ever important or significant such a perception may be in other disci-
plines, is a matter to which the United States Constitution does not
speak." 185
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concluded
that while the precustodial statements were admissible because there was
no state coercion, the postcustodial statements were properly suppressed
because they were not the product of Connelly's free will.'6 In dissent,
Justice Brennan wrote that Connelly's paranoid schizophrenia made him
clearly unable to make an intelligent decision regarding the wisdom of
making such a confession.187
The majority excludes from discussion the notion that Connelly
truly heard from God that he should confess, by eliminating the require-
ment that a criminal defendant waive his rights by an exercise of "free
will" where there is no police coercion. The concurrence by Justice Ste-
vens and the dissent by Justice Brennan assume the incompetence (or
irrationality?) of Connelly without any examination of the plausibility or
possibility of a revelation from God. The belief that God would tell
someone, especially someone who had been treated previously in mental
hospitals, that he should confess was too ludicrous to even contemplate.
This "agnosticism" by the majority and "atheism" by the separate opin-
ions are both consistent with separating law and religion. Liberal polit-
ical theory may be neutral with respect to the good life, but "liberalism is
not neutral with respect to competing conceptions of reality. It does not
183. Id.
184. Id. at 166.
185. Id. at 170-71.
186. Id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Stevens quotes in a
footnote the trial court's conclusion that Connelly's statements were "mandated by auditory halluci-
nation, had no basis in reality, and were the product of a psychotic break with reality." Id. at 173
n.4.
187. Id at 174.
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admit the possibility that religious claims might be objectively real, at the
same time that it does not admit that secular claims might be subjectively
imaginary.""' The Court's opinions, based on liberal thought, create a
vacuum filled by a putatively objective "science," psychiatry,18 9 which
creates or privileges a reality that is unable to conceive of an historical
God who would speak to a person. The Court washes its hands of reli-
gion in an effort to remain "neutral," but that lacuna is filled by psychia-
try, which inevitably displaces religion.
Ronald Lafferty was convicted of killing his sister-in-law and her
fifteen month old daughter. On appeal, he argued to the Supreme Court
of Utah that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was competent
to stand trial, because four psychiatric examiners concluded that he suf-
fered from a "religious delusional system."' 90 One expert testified at the
competency hearing that he believed Lafferty was competent to stand
trial.
Lafferty, who had been excommunicated from the Mormon Church,
told others that he had received a divine revelation that four persons,
including his sister-in-law Brenda Lafferty and her daughter Erica, were
to be "removed." After killing Brenda and Erica, he was arrested and
charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. At a hearing in
October 1984, he was found competent, but was further examined in the
state hospital in November by four examiners after he had assaulted sev-
eral persons in jail. At the end of November, the four examiners con-
cluded Lafferty did not suffer from mental disease or defect, and the
court again found him competent to stand trial. Shortly after Christmas
he attempted suicide, and the same examiners reevaluated Lafferty. In
March 1985, they concluded that Lafferty was incompetent to stand trial
because his pervasive religiosity had turned into a "religious delusional
system."'191
188. Frederick M. Gedicks, Hostility to Religion in the Public Square: The Anti-Religious Di-
mension of Liberalism 25 (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). See also United
States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 741 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing sentence on due process grounds
because sentencing judge based his decision on "personal religious principles.").
189. The privileging of psychiatry over religion in modem Western thought has been subjected
recently to a strong challenge. See ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 1-21 (1990)
(criticizing Sigmund Freud and more recent psychoanalysts for reducingfreligiosity to an occasional
neurosis). See also ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 255-85 (1973) (arguing that the mod-
em effort to use the "therapeutic religion" of psychiatry to replace traditional religions cannot and
will not succeed); PHILIP RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST 257-99 (1959) (arguing that
psychoanalysis is the last great nineteenth century secularism offered to dislodge religion in Western
life and thought).




In affirming the trial court, the Utah court held that "the examiners
diagnoses' were based on the premise that Lafferty's religious beliefs and
experiences did not accord with reality, an unsupportable premise on
which the trial judge could not rely." '92 In November the four court-
appointed examiners had determined Lafferty's religiosity did "not ap-
proach the level of a thought disorder." '93 In the supreme court's view,
the only change regarding Lafferty between November 1984 and March
1985 was the label attached to his religious beliefs. "The trial court
could also reject the examiners' opinions because they were based on un-
founded assumptions about Lafferty's religious experiences.' ' 194 The
court continued, "[T]he examiners thought that Lafferty's religious ex-
periences did not comport with reality. In the absence of some founda-
tion for their assumptions that Lafferty's religious experiences did not
occur, the trial court was justified in rejecting the psychiatrists' conclu-
sions."195 According to the court, the First Amendment's religion
clauses prevented the court from deciding whether these experiences had
occurred. In particular, the majority relied on Ballard v. United
States, 196 in which the Supreme Court concluded that the truth of the
defendant's religious beliefs could not constitutionally be made the basis
of the government's charge of criminal conduct. In a footnote, the court
took judicial notice that Lafferty had been a member of the Mormon
Church, which doctrine included a belief in divine revelation and per-
sonal spiritual experiences. 97
Two concurrences rejected the majority's statement that the Consti-
tution prohibited the examiners or the trial court from relying upon Laf-
ferty's belief in divine revelation to determine his competence. 1 9  The
concurrence of Associate Chief Justice Stewart rejected the conclusion of
the majority that the examiners reached their conclusions by assuming
that Lafferty's religious experiences did not occur. 199
The majority in Lafferty brackets religion a perspective opposite
that of the Connelly court. In Connelly, psychiatry was a substitute for
192. Id. at 1244.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1245.
195. Id. at 1246.
196. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
197. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1246 n.4.
198. Id. at 1262 (Howe, J., concurring, Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Hall concurred
without opinion, and Justice Durham concurred in Justice Howe's opinion. Justice Stewart dis-
sented from the affirmance of the imposition of the death penalty.
199. Id. Justice Stewart also disagreed that the First Amendment required the trial court to
reject the examiners' opinions.
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religion. In Lafferty, the majority notes that Mormon doctrine posits a
person's ability to receive divine personal revelations from God. To hold
that Lafferty could not have received a divine revelation, even as an ex-
communicated Mormon (whether the revelation was accurately under-
stood by Lafferty), is to broadly conclude that divine revelation is
nonexistent. This conclusion would privilege the "knowledge" of secular
(psychiatric) experts regarding conceptions of reality and denigrate the
possibility of religious lowing.2°  However, in order for the court to
appear to decide the case without reference to their religious beliefs, and
in order to prevent a displacement of religious "knowing" with psychiat-
ric "knowing," the court distorts the holding of Ballard v. United
States.201 It concludes that the trial court is constitutionally constrained
to assume the truth of Lafferty's beliefs and find him competent unless
the psychiatrists can prove the invalidity of Lafferty's religious exper-
iences. This burden is, of course, impossible to meet.
The Utah court's stronger argument concerns its response to the
secular belief that makes us unwilling to believe, as one doctor testified,
that "faith in divine intervention was rational.""2 2 This secular belief
dominates the legal system and our legal assumptions about how and
why persons act as they do. The assumption is so pervasive that the
Supreme Court in Connelly found it unnecessary to discuss in any mean-
ingful fashion. The Utah court finds itself unable to discuss issues of
faith in legal terms, instead choosing to hide behind an inartful and inac-
curate interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Ballard. The
present Supreme Court, consciously or not, evidences an agnosticism
which betrays not an impartiality toward religion, but a blindness to reli-
gion. This blindness makes it unable to see when other (secular) faiths
attempt to dislodge religion in society. In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Utah evinces a concern for religion - a concern, however, which is im-
mediately covered with a resort to law, because the court cannot find the
language to speak about religion without contradicting law.
The problem remains that neither court is capable of seriously en-
countering religious belief, nor examining religious belief in light of secu-
200. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 30-31 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that one of the
"characters" of the modem self is the "Therapist"). See generally PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF
THE THERAPEUTIC: UsEs OF FAITH AFTER FREUD (1987).
201. 322 U.S. 78 (944). In Ballard, the Court was concerned with the fairness of submitting to
a jury evidence of the defendants' religious beliefs. Id. at 86. In Lafferty, the Court uses Ballard to
conclude that the defendant's religious beliefs are to be protected in order for the government to try
Lafferty and request the jury sentence him to death. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1246.
202. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1246.
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lar ideas about Reality. This is not to suggest that either Francis
Connelly or Ronald Lafferty is "sane" or "insane." It is to suggest that
pretending that religion is safely cabined away from legal discourse will
not make religion go away.
Divine revelation may or may not have come to Francis Connelly
and/or'Ronald Lafferty. The appeal to religion to justify and excuse the
cruelest actions did not begin and will not end with the punishment of
these two men. It may simply be that a belief that the American legal
system is a rational legal system precludes acknowledging evidence of
religion. However, the absence of a theoretical foudation and/or the lack
of a vocabulary for religion in law does not mean that religion does not
exist.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, both the United States and its citizens prospered when
church and state were successfully separated. Before the First Amend-
ment prohibited the Congressional establishment of religion, it seemed
paradoxical to believe that religion was better protected by ending the
formal ties between religion and government. The American experiment
to disentangle church and state showed that religious liberty (although
not necessarily religious sects) would thrive, and the paradox dissolved.
Constitutional protection of religious liberty resulted in the proliferation
of amazingly diverse religions and religious beliefs. The separation
model, cast as an aspirational ideal, protected and promoted religious
liberty.
Beginning fifty years ago, however, the aspirational ideal of separa-
tion was transformed into a legal instrument. The Supreme Court began
applying the model of separation throughout the public (including legal)
order. A primary purpose for applying the separation model was to elim-
inate the influence of religious discourse, and religion generally, from
public discourse. Since the many religious beliefs present in American
society were incompatible with one another, and since religious expres-
sion was equated with the irrational or emotional, privatizing religion
was believed necessary to protect the state. The language of the public
square was to be limited to secular, rational, "non-religious" discourse.
The problem with using the separation model was that the aspirational
ideal of separation was premised on the belief that separation better pro-
tected religious believers, while applicants of the separation model in dif-
ferent venues in American public life were based on protecting the state
from the incursion of religion. Transferring the project of separation
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without transferring the premises of the project distorted the value of,
and rationales for, separation.
The goal of the tolerant society was to seal religion from the public
square. But the separation model has failed to demarcate any space be-
tween secular and religious. Specifically, the quest to exclude religion
from the formal resolution of disputes is impossible as long as dispute
resolution involves persons, and as long as persons continue to embrace
religion.
The effort to calibrate the proper degree of separation continues,
however, for the legal system is incapable of considering religion in any
other way. Federal Rule of Evidence 610 and the cases discussed
throughout this article are examples of the inability of lawmakers to rec-
ognize religion, except through a categorical rule based on the formal
ideal of separation. Not only does Rule 610 fail to achieve its purpose, it
masks a wide range of issues about which the legal system seems baffled.
The vocabulary permitting a different approach to questions of reli-
gion and the courtroom does not exist. Courts faced with unusual
problems of law and religion resort to a formal neutrality and separation
in part because they are unable to articulate any alternative approach.
The legal system is unable to talk about religion any other way, and it is
unlikely that this will change. A beginning would require a reevaluation
of liberty of conscience and the permissibility of "exercising" one's faith
in both a secular and religiously pluralistic society. This beginning
would require, as Professor Edmund Morgan suggested in another con-
text,20 3 a radical reformation of American society, something highly un-
likely. We lack an understanding which will provide us with the
capability of acknowledging religion without immediately returning to
religious discrimination. This chasm created by silence grows wider the
longer words are unavailable to us.
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." 2"
203. See Morgan, Proposed Code, supra note 47, at 540; Foreword, supra note 9, at 6 (Arguing in
1940, "It is time, too, for radical reformation of the law of evidence.").
204. LuDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 151 (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuiness trans., 1961) (1921).
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